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LOCKE AS THE KEY
PREFATORY NOTE
This essay is written for professionals and students who have a
working knowledge of the Supreme Court cases concerning person-
al jurisdiction. In order to achieve an uninterrupted flow of my
analysis, I have, by and large, avoided technical citation and reci-
tation of case facts. This essay, which offers major
reconceptualizations, concentrates exclusively on the chief prece-
dents and does not frequently cite secondary literature.' During
my 25 years as a civil procedure professor, I have read the bulk
of the International Shoe2 articles and many personal jurisdiction
opinions of the lower federal bench. To the best of my knowledge
little of that vast corpus of thinking is relevant to my central con-
cepts and, thus, would not add value to this essay.
I. INTRODUCTION
[Cloherent, stable-and morally supportable-government is
possible only on the basis of consent, and.., the secret
of consent is the sense of common venture fostered by
institutions that reflect and represent us and that we can
call to account.3
1. I have consulted the following articles in preparing this essay. Robert H. Abrams
and Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court
Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REv. 75 (1984); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77 [hereinafter
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count]; Geoffrey C. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 241; Earl M. Maltz, Personal Jurisdiction and Constitu-
tional Theory - A Comment on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 689
(1991); Linda A. Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presump-
tive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS LJ. 569
(1991); David A. Sonenshein, The Error of a Balancing Approach to the Due Process
Determination of Jurisdiction Over the Person, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1986); Allan R. Stein,
Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.
597 (1991); Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible Levels of Harm,
22 RUTGERS LJ. 659 (1991) [hereinafter Twitchell, Levels of Harm]; Mary Twitchell, The
Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988) [hereinafter Twitchell,
Myth]; Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Developments in the Law - State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L REV. 909 (1960) [hereinafter Developments].
2. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (landmark decision es-
tablishing present minimum contacts analysis of personal jurisdiction).
3. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 20 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press
1986).
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This article concerns a handful of Supreme Court cases which
have tantalized the legal profession for decades, the personal juris-
diction cases.4 Hardly a term goes by without another case being
swept into the vortex of this doctrinal "black hole."5 With each
new effort to clarify the doctrine more mass is added to the im-
ploding nucleus: more "tests", more sub-doctrines, more words to
puzzle over.6
Several Justices have attempted to clarify this murky doctrine.'
4. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, Ill S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987); Omni Capital Int'l., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Hess v. Pawloskl, 274 U.S. 352 (1927);
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90 (1917); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877).
5. See cases cited supra note 4. No pejorative has been spared by the academics in
describing the International Shoe doctrine. For a recent sprinkling, see Silberman, supra
note 1, at 572 n.17 ("uncertainty and confusion"); Stein, supra note 1, at 598 ("totally
incoherent"); Twitchell, Levels of Harm, supra note 1, at 666 ("jurisdictional stew"); Rus-
sell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERs
LJ. 611, 625 (1991) (-chaos-).
6. Particularly frightening to me are subtleties such as Professor Twitchell's "condi-
tional general jurisdiction" found in lower federal court opinions. See Twitchell, Myth,
supra note 1, at 611-12 (criticizing the courts' application of general and specific juris-
diction).
7. Justice Marshall was the chief writer when the Court returned to the doctrine in
the 70's. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 84 (holding that it would be unreasonable to subject one
to personal jurisdiction in California based solely on acquiescence in child's desire to live
with her mother in California); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186 (upholding the minimum contacts
principles of International Shoe). The baton then passed to Justice White. See Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 694 (holding that courts may impose a finding of personal
jurisdiction where a defendant fails to comply with discovery orders in a proceeding to
determine whether the forum has jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at
286 (holding that defendant's lack of minimum contacts in Oklahoma renders personal
jurisdiction there unjust regardless of the foreseeability that the product would find its
way into Oklahoma). Next Justice Rehnquist took charge. See Phillips Petroleum, 472
U.S. at 797 (holding that Kansas must have significant contact or aggregation of contacts
to the asserted claims of each class member to ensure that jurisdiction is not arbitrary or
unfair); Calder, 465 U.S. at 783 (permitting jurisdiction over defendants in California
based on the effects of their conduct which was calculated to cause injury to a California
[Vol. 43:97
LOCKE AS THE KEY
The academics have written reams.' Yet, almost a half-century
after International Shoe, the personal jurisdiction doctrine continues
to be incomprehensible.
In this essay I employ time-honored common law techniques to
attempt a synthesis of the Supreme Court personal jurisdiction
cases. I first inquire into the heart of the cases, their ratio
decidendi. At the core of these cases, I find the political philoso-
phy of one of democracy's great theoreticians, John Locke.9 In
particular, these cases contain the Lockean concept of a compact
between the government and the governed whereby the power of
the former is invested by concession of the latter.'* The defendant
in a lawsuit is the "governed" while the court is the "governor".
resident); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (permitting jurisdiction
over defendant to answer for contents of national publication wherever a substantial num-
ber of copies are regularly sold and distributed). By far, the most words have spilled
from the pen of Justice Brenan. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that exercise of personal jurisdiction over a transient defendant based on his
voluntary presence in the forum complies with due process requirements); Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (arguing that although the defendant purpose-
fully availed itself of state benefits, fairness and justice prevent the exercise of personal
jurisdiction due to the severe burden on the defendant and the forum state's lack of inter-
est in the dispute); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 463-87 (holding that a forum may assert
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the defendant purposefully directs actions
towards the forum and causes injury and where principles of fairness and justice are not
otherwise offended); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 419-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that it is fair and reasonable to subject a defendant to suit in a forum with which it has
significant contacts directly related to the underlying cause of action); Keeton, 465 U.S. at
482 (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that the contacts between Hustler and New Hamp-
shire are sufficiently important and sufficiently related to the underlying cause of action to
satisfy the requirements of due process); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 299-
313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Oklahoma's interest in the case and the ab-
sence of inconvenience to the defendant mean that personal jurisdiction does not offend
the principles of due process); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that Kulko's contacts with California as a parent of children domiciled in the state
were sufficient to require him to conduct his defense in California without violating the
principles of due process); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the defendants voluntarily initiated a fiduciary rela-
tionship with a Delaware corporation and should be subject to personal jurisdiction in a
suit pertaining to that fiduciary relationship).
8. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
9. The monumental impact of John Locke on the formation of American government
has been concisely described by Professor Gardner. See James A. Gardner, Consent, Legit-
imacy and Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution,
52 U. PIrr. L. REV. 189, 192-213 (1990). The premise derived from Locke's writings is
that "the legitimacy of the United States government - that is, its rule by right rather
than by force - rests on the consent of the governed. Id. at 192.
10. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Pro-
metheus 1986) (1690) [hereinafter LocKE].
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Thus, in theory, the power exercised by a court over a party flows
from the consent of the party itself. This consent could at times be
actual, but more frequently is implied through benefits obtained or
risks created by the party while inside the political forum in which
the court sits.
Locke asserts that individuals surrender their natural autonomy
to governments in order to obtain the liberties found in an ordered
society, thus avoiding the hazards present in a natural state." This
leads me to a critical understanding - that a reciprocity binds
court and party. The party has garnered the benefits offered by the
government in which the court sits. These benefits include the
laws, the administrative framework and their restraining effects. In
return, the party concedes to that government a quantum of power
to govern his conduct, a power which he himself holds in a natural
autonomous state.
I find this reciprocity to be the "fair play" which International
Shoe demands of courts in their dealings with defendants.1 As
this essay unfolds, we will discover how Lockean concepts restore
simplicity and elegance to the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. We
learn, for example, why "arising out of," or "specific" jurisdiction
is always fair play and why its antinome, "unrelated," or "general"
jurisdiction, is ordinarily unfair. We further gain the important
insight that the benefits reaped by the defendant within the forum's
territory must be balanced against the reciprocal' duties imposed by
the court. These duties consist of various orders and judgments
which might be issued by the court in the course of litigation.
These orders and judgments must be justified by an assessment of
"contacts." From this insight, I naturally accept the idea of "di-
visible jurisdiction," meaning that the power of the tribunal is not
unitary but varies depending upon the quantum of the defendant's
forum contacts. Under divisible jurisdiction, the sufficiency of these
contacts is measured against the weightiness of specific orders
issued in specific cases.
While this article adds some new dimensions like "divisible
jurisdiction," the application of Locke's reciprocity principle works
powerfully to simplify in personam doctrine. The analysis within
teaches how the courts have ample power over the bulk of defen-
11. Id. at 54.
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ('maintenance of
[a] suit [must] not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice') (citing
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
[Vol. 43:97
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dants who appear before them. The few hard cases involve asserted
court powers which can be labelled "extraordinary" in light of a
case's particular circumstances. Here, Lockean reciprocity offers a
simple analytical framework which strips the in personam doctrine
clean of its verbal encrustations and enables fairness to be ascer-
tained accurately and efficiently.
I do not undertake any challenge to the social validity of the
Court's premises. This essay merely clarifies the existing in perso-
nam doctrine. I, like many colleagues, have dark moments in
which I yearn for the rough but swift justice of the Pennoyer"3
rules. Such a fundamental challenge, however, will have to await
another day.
II. THE DEFECrS OF INTERNATIONAL SHOE
The Supreme Court's struggles to articulate a coherent, work-
able doctrine of personal jurisdiction stem principally from the
initial inadequate craftsmanship in International Shoe.'4 In this
section I shall examine the flaws in Justice Stone's majority opin-
ion. The analysis will show the deficiencies in the Court's execu-
tion of the philosophic shift from a territorial basis for the personal
jurisdiction doctrine to one of individual liberty.
The primary error was, of course, the emptiness of the famous
language "certain minimum contacts" so that the assertion of state
court power is "fair play and substantial justice."' 5 I call it "lan-
guage" because it is too vacuous to be considered "doctrine" or
"norm" or even "general norm." Justice Stone did not provide a
qualitative adjective synonymous with "minimum." He made no
general proposition that fairness requires just a little contact be-
tween the defendant and the forum state.'6 Rather, the opinion
13. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (stating that, except when limited by
the Constitution, "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory').
14. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310 (holding that a person may be subject to in
personam jurisdiction if he has certain minimum contacts within the forum such that the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
15. Id. at 316.
16. Thus, the idea that surfaces in Justice Brennan's opinions - that the plaintiff need
only demonstrate some minimal affiliation between the defendant and the forum in order
to trigger a free-wheeling reasonableness analysis - is one that has no backers, no
grounding in precedent, and no rationale. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 477 (1984) (asserting that considerations such as burden on defendant, interest of
forum state, and plaintiff's need for relief may establish jurisdiction despite a lack of
minimum contacts); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300
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means that the contacts must be sufficient in order for jurisdiction
to be fair. 7 Consequently, he unwittingly confused generations of
civil procedure students.
We can also quickly dismiss any idea that the phrases "fair
play" and "substantial justice" have different meanings. Nothing in
International Shoe or its progeny offers any ground for distinguish-
ing "fair" and "just." They seem to be two identical empty vessels
waiting for contents.
That the Chief Justice had not himself worked out a fairness
theory is evident from the critical passage in which he summarizes
and characterizes the "contacts" between International Shoe Compa-
ny and the State of Washington and adjudicates under "these stan-
dards." 18 After describing the company's business in Washington
as "neither irregular nor casual," as "systematic and continuous," as
"a large volume of interstate business," as receiving "benefits and
protections" of the state's legal order, and as causing "the obliga-
tion which is here sued upon," the Justice leaves us adrift by pro-
claiming "[i]t is evident" that contacts are "sufficient" for fair
play. 9 How the conclusion is "evident" is a mystery. How much
regularity is enough? What about small but recurrent contact? How
many shoes become a "large" volume? What kind and amount of
benefit and protection is enough? Is the "arising from" factor an
invariable fairness trump? Did we need every adjective in the pas-
sage to find fairness? If just some, which?
Our case law system sometimes permits judges to be inarticu-
late about their rationales. No matter how obscure a court's reason-
ing, we can match present facts with the facts found in precedents
and eventually develop inclusionary and exclusionary tests. But
Justice Stone even strips us of the method of analogy. We are
instructed that because the fairness equation is not "mechanical or
quantitative,"" we should not look at what contacts we have in
the case before us and evaluate whether they are a little more or a
little less than what we find in the precedents. Yet, Justice Stone,
if we are to be fact sensitive and discriminating, against what do
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the amount of contacts needed to support
jurisdiction diminish when other considerations such as interests of forum state and the
burden on defendant help establish that jurisdiction is fair and reasonable).
17. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (sufficiency of contact determined by its
nature and quality).
18. Id. at 320.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 319.
[Vol. 43:97
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we evaluate facts?2 1
In sum, contacts sufficient to do substantial justice is no work-
able formula. We do not even see the "test" at work in Interna-
tional Shoe because the conclusion was "evident" to the Chief
Justice. Perhaps the key is found in what Chief Justice Stone called
"standards." 22 These are matters which we should include in the
fairness "formula," though their position and ranking in such is
unclear. Almost immediately after the "minimum contacts" passage,
Justice Stone begins to mention these standards in disorderly fash-
ion.' I will paraphrase them (minus their antonyms) in the order
in which they appear:
1. the context of interstate federalism ("our federal system
of government");
2. the inconveniences of a trial away from home;
3. continuous and systematic activities;
4. forum state activities which give rise to plaintiff's
claim;
5. the nature, quality and circumstances of contacts;
6. the fair and orderly administration of the laws; and,
7. obtaining forum state benefits and protection.24
If fairness were defined, we might understand the relevance of
these matters, their inter-relationships, and their relative strengths.
As presented in International Shoe, however, they are mere ver-
biage to describe contacts, not guideposts to determine fairness.
Without a connecting concept, an intermediary thought, the
relationship between defendants' contacts with the state and fairness
is unknown and unknowable. Contacts are physical events, merely
describable as such, and carry no internal morality. Only if we
measure these physical events against some moral standard can we
begin to draw conclusions about justice and fairness. If the contact
is, for example, my punching you in the nose, we cannot test for
"rightness" or "justice" without the aid of legal or moral principles,
such as "unconsented battery is unlawful" or "proportionate retalia-
tion is morally acceptable."
21. Justice Brennan speaks of a "weighing of the facts." See Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, there
is no structured analysis behind the phrase.
22. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
23. See id. at 317-19.
24. Id.
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Yet we search in vain in International Shoe for a clear, dis-
criminate statement of the needed moral imperative. We shall even-
tually ferret it out of the opinion's inventory of relevant factors.
But neither in its critical "certain minimum contacts" passage, nor
in its due process foundation, nor elsewhere does Chief Justice
Stone's opinion identify the missing link.
I. THE LOCKEAN COMPACT
The missing fairness link is John Locke's theory of a political
compact by which people surrender their state-of-nature powers of
punishment and retaliation to a government which, in return, prom-
ises them the greater freedoms possible in an ordered society.
Locke wrote of those entering a community, thereby explicitly sur-
rendering their natural autonomy and consenting to governance by
the political power of that group.25 Thus, the foundation of fair-
ness seems to be consent.
In some cases, consent may be actual; Locke believed this to
be the case in primitive communities.26 In a large, complex, mod-
eri society, however, consent is constructive. We do not ask
whether a community member considered such matters, nor
whether he can extricate himself from surrounding political con-
trols. Instead, we attribute consent to people because of their affili-
ating activities. In the following passage Locke describes this as
"tacit consent":
The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit
consent, and how far it binds - i.e., how far any one shall
be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to
any government, where he has made no expressions of it at
all. And to this I say, that every man that hath any posses-
sion or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any
government doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is as
far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that govern-
ment, during such enjoyment, as any one under it, whether
this his possession be of land to him and his heirs forever,
or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely trav-
elling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as
25. See LOCKE, supra note 10, at 55.
26. See id. at 57 (discussing the civilizations of Rome, Venice, and Peru).
[Vol. 43:97
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far as the very being of any one within the territories of
that government.
27
"Tacit" or "constructive" consent is a metaphor, or perhaps a
misdescription with a laudable purpose; that of permitting legal
norms to expand within the comforting categories of known, ac-
cepted law. Fairness is no longer based upon individual will, but
upon a different fairness criterion, perhaps that of political expedi-
ency. Fairness now depends on an exchange whereby the govern-
ment takes the natural liberty of persons and gives them an ordered
society in return. Here, choice is irrelevant; what counts is the
fairness of the bargain. For the sake of the larger good we cannot
allow islands of autonomy in the midst of our organized polity.
The hermit in the cave, despite his protests, is still subject to the
community's will.
We start with a very capitalistic concept at work in a market-
place economy. It is fair for a state's governmental organs to exer-
cise power over an individual because he has profited from that
state's ordered liberty. If that individual has had no contacts, ties
or relations with that group of people and its government, then he
should not be called upon to perform any political duty, such as
appearing in court.
The idea of reciprocity between the defendant and the state in
judging the fairness of power assertions by courts has been hinted
at in in personam cases in the past. Though this was not the cen-
tral focus of Pennoyer, m its dicta the Court acknowledged that
defendants could consent to a court's power.29 Such consent intro-
duces a quite different relationship, that between defendant and
state. If the Court's concern focused exclusively on umpiring pow-
er disputes between states, consent would have to come, not from
the defendant but from the non-forum states, and an individual
could not be permitted to waive the objections of these states.
Thus, while muted and confined, the Lockean idea of an agreement
between a person and a polity stretched back into the last century's
jurisdictional theorizing. Over the years, the law would slowly shift
27. Id at 67. In her excellent challenge to consent as a basis for personal jurisdiction
as opposed to territorial sovereignty, Professor Brilmayer focuses exclusively on actual
consent and does not consider this aspect of Locke's political "bargain." See Lea
Brilnayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989) [hereinafter
Brilmayer, Consent].
28. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
29. Id. at 735-36.
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from an interstate federalism doctrinal base to a liberty base. Inter-
national Shoe merely culminated this shift.
Indeed, before International Shoe the reciprocity-as-fairness
idea had already surfaced several times in the Court's in personam
cases.30  Recall Hess v. Pawloski,3' in which Hess's entering
Massachusetts (where he allegedly drove his car into Pawloski)
made him subject to that state's judicial power. The Court believed
it fair for Hess to "answer for his conduct in the State;" 32 espe-
cially because his conduct had given rise to the grievance. While
the Court's opinion is couched in terms of "implied consent," such
language of human will disguises the government's need to regu-
late dangerous conduct within its boundaries. Hess also suggests
that in-state conduct may be alternatively or simultaneously risk-
creating and benefit-reaping.
Though reciprocity-as-fairness had to be teased out of Hess, in
Milliken v. Meyer33 it is explicitly the ratio decidendi for subject-
ing an absent domiciliary to process in his hometown courts. Jus-
tice Douglas' brief opinion intoned:
"Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state,
and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws,
are inseparable" from the various incidents of state citizen-
ship .... The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out
of the relationship to the state which domicile creates.'
Given this natural bridge to a "contacts" theory of jurisdictional
due process, International Shoe's step forward was not as large as
many might imagine. In fact, just before his pro-jurisdiction con-
clusion Justice Stone stated:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege
30. For early examples, see Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 107 (1898) (criti-
cizing the "manifest injustice" for a company to be "exempt from the burdens" while "al-
lowed the benefits" of the forum state); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882) (ac-
knowledging that where a corporation is protected by a state's laws, it is "only right" to
require the corporation to respond in the state's courts); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407-08 (1855) (holding that a company selling insurance within a
state "for [its] benefit and profit" is "under obligation to attend").
31. 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upholding a statute declaring that non-resident motorists
consent to service of process on the state registrar in cases arising from their use of state
highways).
32. Id. at 356.
33. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
34. Id at 463-64 (citing Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932)
and New York ex reL Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937)).
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of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits
and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of
that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as
these obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state, a procedure which requires the
corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them
can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
35
This is pure Locke. Unfortunately though, Justice Stone added
reciprocity as merely one of the factors to be considered rather
than emphasizing it as the central concept. This deemphasizing of
the fair play rationale allowed the doctrine to mutate into its cur-
rent, incoherent form.
36
35. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
36. To this point I have stated nothing very novel. If the reciprocity philosophy had
not clearly emerged at the time of International Shoe, it was surely the critical concern in
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In that case there were cogent practical reasons
to vest Florida with adjudicatory authority. Most of the parties were Floridians, all of
whom had an unchallengeable interest in single-piece adjudication. Yet the common sense
of the sitoation was insufficient to overcome the idea of reciprocity as fairness. The re-
cord revealed no contacts between Florida and an indispensable party, the Delaware trust-
ee. Id. at 251. The trustee had not benefited from Flojida's sun, sand, or society. Con-
sequently, the predicate for jurisdiction was missing: "some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state . . . . " Id. at 253. In Lockean terms the trustee had not surrendered its pure auton-
omy, at least not to Florida. LocKE, supra note 10, at 14.
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IV. THE PRIMARY FAIRNESS BALANCE: BENEFiTS AND RISKS
VERSUS POWER
A. The "Benefits and Risks" Side of the Balance
The first piece of the formula is easy to place. Graphics can







The "contacts" weight represents, of course, the affiliations
between the defendant and the forum state. Such affiliations are
appraised in two ways. First, the appraisal considers advantages the
defendant has achieved in the forum state: money earned, pleasures
taken, contracts concluded, products sold, suits prosecuted, and so
forth. The productive use by the defendant of the forum state's
ordered society produces an equitable reciprocity, here meaning the
exercise of forum power against the defendant in forms like taxa-
tion, jury duty, or amenability to suit. This, then, is what I mean
by the "benefits" portion of the "contacts" weight.
The other portion is "risks." This is an appraisal of the
defendant's forum contact in terms of its actual or potential harm-
ful effects within the forum, probably the most important Interna-
tional Shoe factor. The doctrine under study is relevant to cases in
which the defendant is sued because of some alleged transgression
he committed, harming the plaintiff (think of Hess driving reck-
lessly into Pawloski).37 Other pernicious consequences of the
defendant's acts include the violation of the forum's laws, a "pub-
37. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 353 (1927).
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lic wrong" which is of legitimate concern to the forum's inhabit-
ants. Hess's reckless driving infringed the right of the people of
Massachusetts to lawful behavior within state boundaries - the
public duty aspect of unlawful conduct represented by symbols like
speeding tickets. Thus, even if the illegal act within a forum
caused no individual harm there, but only outside forum bound-
aries, it is still of Shoe relevancy because of the affront to the
"ordered society" where it was perpetrated.
The "contacts" weight pushes toward a finding of "jurisdiction"
because this is what justifies the state's demands of the defendant.
The greater the defendant's forum affiliations, the greater the justi-
fication for a forum to haul him into its courts.
The International Shoe adjectives come to life when understood
in the Lockean sense of a person reaping benefits from an ordered
society or wreaking havoc therein.39 "Continuous" and "systemat-
ic" point in the direction of significant benefits and risks; "casual,"
"single" or "isolated" in the opposite direction. We now know why
the precise form of affiliation is important - "nature and quality"
in International Shoe terms. Some contacts reap large benefits.
Filing a multi-million dollar lawsuit in a state's trial court is one
example, executing an important contract in a state is another.
Other contacts within a forum endanger its inhabitants. For exam-
ple, a large risk would flow from entering a state in a high-speed
car chase. In sum, looking through the Lockean prism, we assess
the extent to which the defendant has used or abused the "ordered
society," that is, the network of laws and institutions created and
maintained by the state's inhabitants.
40
An additional consideration is whether it is relevant that bene-
fits or risks are often potential instead of actual. Our natural ten-
dency is to value birds in the hand more than those in the bush. It
would be sensible to emphasize recorded facts which, quantify and
demonstrate the defendant's actual benefits derived from his so-
journ in the forum state, and comparably for destructions as op-
posed to mere risks. But here we need not be precise. The fairness
formula is not mathematical but philosophical.
38. Id. at 356.
39. LoCKE, supra note 10, at 95 (state has power, derived from consent of the gov-
erned, to "make laws, and annex such penalties to them as may tend to the preservation
of the whole").
40. Id. at 67 (arguing that consent to governance exists where the governed enjoys
"any part of the dominions of any government, " including possession of land, lodging or
free travel upon highways).
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One point, however, does merit emphasis. The benefits we
receive from the laws and institutions of an ordered society are
real even though inchoate. The shadow of law and courts looms
large and restrains those who might otherwise act against the social
order. Law works best when obeyed and worst when broken. Con-
sequently, those multiple, incipient benefits we reap from the polity
where we exist do count and often count mightily when our pres-
ence is lengthy and active.
B. The "Power" Side of the Balance
On the "no jurisdiction" side of the primary balance I place a






By "power" I mean the full demand made upon the defendant
by the forum court. Such demand equals the sum total of the judg-
ments and orders issued or issuable against the defendant by such
court. In the weight pictured above, the word "burden" below the
dotted line represents the onus of coming to court in response to a
court subpoena or other process. This is typically a small part of
the power exercised by a court against a defendant. I give it spe-
cial attention only because it plays an important role in the Court's
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
Power pushes toward a finding of no jurisdiction because a
state's claims against a person need justification, which is the
"contact" just discussed, and the greater those claims the greater
must be the basis.
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The idea of measuring forum contacts against a court's full set
of demands upon the defendant departs significantly from tradition-
al Shoe doctrine. The Court has regularly conceived of the
defendant's reciprocal burden only as that of a foreign defense.
This was one of several International Shoe relevancies: an "esti-
mate of the inconveniences" which the defendant would suffer
from a trial away from its "home" or "principal place of
business."" In later cases, which attempted to vest the in perso-
nam doctrine with theoretical coherence and structure, the contacts
analysis was seen as "protect[ing] the defendant against the burdens
of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum."'42 Taking the
Court literally, we would place on the left side of our fairness
scale a single weight representing the quantum of litigation unfair-
ness caused by having to travel away from "home."
Under Locke's concept of reciprocity we cannot stop where the
Court has. The Lockean approach would ask about the totality of
reciprocal duties expected of the "citizen" by his "fellow citi-
zens."" In the state of nature X and Y may punish each other
based upon their respective assessment of the other's violations of
the natural order.44 But in ordered liberty, X and Y turn over to
the State those assessments and constructively agree to be bound
by its dictates. The Lockean reciprocity, thus, includes acceptance
of the punishments and sanctions meted out by the State against X
or Y.
In terms of jurisdictional due process, I am led to the conclu-
sion that we must assess the full quantum of power being asserted
by a state court against a defendant. Forcing a defendant to re-
spond to a summons in order to avoid a default judgment is but a
small, introductory piece of that power. During the course of a
civil litigation, several papers will issue under the court's seal and
command the defendant to do this or that. Moreover, the "power"
of the court's litigation rules controls the defendant's litigation"
conduct. The final paper, the court's judgment, embodies the ulti-
mate power of taking the defendant's property or controlling his
41. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45
F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
42. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). See
also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) ("travail of defending in
a distant forum"); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) ("burden and incon-
venience' of California defense).
43. See LOCKE, supra note 10, at 11.
44. Id. (suggesting that men have a right to retaliate to preserve the natural order).
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behavior under threat of contempt.
How can we assess the weight of a court's power? The answer
is that here, as with many preliminary jurisdictional questions, we
make the best possible assessment based on available information.
To determine the potential judgments assertable against the defen-
dant, we look to the "relief sought" clause in the plaintiff's com-
plaint. If a plaintiff is opaque in his request for relief, then a mo-
tion for a more definite statement would be in order.45
C. Balancing the Weights to Determine Jurisdiction
Figure Three combines the two elements of the primary balance









The contacts push towards jurisdiction; the exercise of power,
needing justification, pushes towards "no jurisdiction." Hopefully
the reader will forgive me for using the infelicitous balancing
metaphor. "Balancing" is misleading because a balance between the
two weights would lead to irresolution. Imbalance leads to a deci-
sion because the scale in Figure Three must tip in order to resolve
the jurisdictional inquiry. For the sake of simplicity and elegance, I
refrain, nonetheless, from calling it an "imbalance test."
This "power versus contacts" idea immediately shines a beacon
into some of personal jurisdiction's dark corners. We now under-
stand why the Shaffer court could confidently say that there would
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
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be no unfairness in a plaintiff's execution of a judgment against a
defendant's dispersed property.' The executing court should not
do a full contacts probe because that body is exercising such limit-
ed power against the judgment debtor. That court is not assessing
liability and measuring compensation but merely making property
available to satisfy the liquidated claim. Instead the assessing and
measuring is done by a judgment-issuing court with "full" in per-
sonam power.
This concept also clarifies the inchoate equity in an "arising
from" case such as McGee.47 Why was it fair to subject a defen-
dant like International Life Insurance Company to California court
power when there was no proof of contacts beyond the single
incident in litigation? The answer is provided by the "power versus
contacts" reciprocity. It was fair to hold the defendant chargeable
and responsible for the effects of its singular entry. Such holding
to account occurs not merely in forcing the defendant to come to
California but, more importantly, in vesting California's courts with
the power to enter a compensatory judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff, Lulu McGee. Assuming the plaintiff makes no unusual de-
mands in his petition, the reciprocity is perfect. A state court al-
ways has enough power to clean up the ill effects of defendant's
entry, however brief, into that state. This. translates into an auto-
matic enhancement of the "contacts" weight whenever a causal
connection exists between defendant's conduct in the forum state
and the claim sub judice48
As another exathple, the decision in Insurance Corporation of
Ireland 9 is incomprehensible when measured against the Court's
doctrinal formulations. Despite Justice White's unconvincing state-
ment to the contrary,50 one easily sees paradox in the entry of
46. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210-11 n.36 (1977).
47. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (holding that
respondent's contract was not unconstitutionally impaired even though the California stat-
ute did not become effective until after respondent had assumed the obligation). Professor
Twitchell suggests the phrase "dispute-specific" to describe cases in which the relationship
between the dispute and the forum is relevant to the jurisdictional question. See Twitchell,
Myth, supra note 1, at 613. Professor Brilmayer focuses on a "related" contact, meaning
that one of the events relevant to the substantive issues being litigated took place in the
forum. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 1, at 87-88.
48. For more discussion of these "arising out ot situations see infra text accompany-
ing notes 98-106.
49. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982) (holding a no-contact defendant subject to personal jurisdiction because he defied a
district courts discovery orders).
50. id at 706 ("By submitting to the jurisdiction of the court for the limited purpose
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any order by a state court against a defendant who has no forum
contacts. After all, the Court has held time and again, no contacts,
no power.5"
Rather than soft shoeing around that barrier like Justice White,
let us look at the problem through the Lockean reciprocity
prism.52 On the left side of the balance we have a mild request
made even milder by the trial court's power under the rules of
procedure to alleviate burdensome discovery requests: "Please an-
swer some questions about your business in Pennsylvania. If it's
financially onerous, we'll entertain a Rule 26(c) protective or-
der."53 Note how small the "power" weight is. For fairness, we
need only a slight "contacts" weight. Normally, the plaintiff can
find enough "contact" to vest the court with discovery power with-
out the court's assistance. By making some simple inquiries, the
plaintiff could have easily obtained dozens of sources to ascertain
an international re-insurer's dealings in Pennsylvania.-4 Such in-
quiries would even produce the positive effect of reducing jurisdic-
tionally frivolous suits against non-residents when the plaintiff has
no reason to suspect defendant has any forum state contacts. 55 Al-
ternatively, Ireland can be analyzed by appraising the company's
motion to dismiss as seeking a benefit from the court, namely a
of challenging jurisdiction, the defendant agrees to abide by that court's determination on
the issue of jurisdiction.").
51. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (reaffrm-
ing the reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980) ("no contacts with the forum"); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) ("total absence of . . . affiliating circum-
stances"); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978) ("did not purposefully derive
benefit"); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) ("[a]ppellants have ... had noth-
ing to do with the state of Delaware"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)
(defendant invokes the protections of forum state when he purposefully avails himself of
the privilege of conducting activities there); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
52. See LOCKs, supra note 10, at 8-14 (discussing the reciprocity of power and juris-
diction).
53. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d
877, 882 (3d Cir. 1981), aff'd sub. nom. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
54. See id. at 881 (plaintiff's affidavit contained a list of contacts relating to the re-
insurer's dealings in Pennsylvania).
55. To ask the plaintiff to make some pre-discovery inquiries about the defendant's
forum affiliations is no more and perhaps less burdensome than the "reasonable inquiry"
into the merits to avoid Rule 11 sanctions. See, e.g., Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enters., 111 S. CL 922 (1991) (holding that Rule 11 imposes an objec-
tive standard of reasonable inquiry).
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decision clarifying that the company need not fear that body's
judgments. The company could have stayed away but only at the
risk of losing its defense on the merits should it be defeated on the
jurisdictional question in a later proceeding elsewhere to enforce
the default judgment.56 That benefit, though small, justifies the
court's power to make mildly burdensome discovery requests of the
insurance company.
I suggest that beneath the Ireland case was the unexpressed
feeling that the defendant, a player in international insurance mar-
kets,5 7 likely had enough Pennsylvania affiliations to satisfy Shoe
and that its evasions and protests were legal machinations. I doubt
that the Court would use the jurisdiction-as-penalty rationale
against its hypothetical distant soft drink vendor selling a Coke to
an interstate traveller.
58
The "no contacts, no power" axiom also cornered the Court in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,59 which resulted in a disappoint-
ing jurisdictional decision. The decision was not, however, disap-
pointing in terms of the court's conclusion. It made good sense to
vest state courts with nationwide class action jurisdiction in small
claim cases, particularly in light of Eisen's6° and Zahn's6' clos-
ing of federal courthouse doors. Otherwise, these $100 claims
would be forfeited for lack of a cost-efficient forum.
However, the method used by the Court to reach its conclusion
was inadequate. The Court's answer to determine how a Kansas
judgment could affect these "no contact" nonresidents was a series
of inartful dodges. On the "effects" side of the balance, the Court
essentially said to class members, "Don't come to defend your
property. It's only $100 and the court and class representative will
protect you."62 The burden-of-a-foreign-defense factor was fi-
56. See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 21 (1890) (upholding the constitutionality of
forbidding defendant to challenge service validity without surrendering to jurisdiction of
the court).
57. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 696 (describing defendant's business deal-
ings).
58. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1979).
59. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
60. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (dismissing a federal court
class action where petitioner refused to bear the prohibitively high cost of sending individ-
ual notice to all the members of his class).
61. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1974) (dismissing a federal
court class action where the unnamed plaintiffs could not show damages in the jurisdic-
tional amount).
62. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 809.
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nessed by stripping the class members of a defense! The weirdness
of this rationale is accentuated by juxtaposing it with the Court's
unequivocal right-to-a-hearing doctrine which offers the same $100
full procedural protection.63 The same due process clause exalts
the "property" in one doctrinal branch (procedural due process) and
mocks it in another (jurisdictional due process).
Phillips Petroleum also resorts to fictitious reasoning, a judicial
technique which is generally unwise and particularly offensive in
the personal jurisdiction field given Shoe's and Shaffer's and
Rush's condemnation of the practice.64 The Court presumes that
each of those 28,000 royalty owners who did not return their "opt
out" forms consented to Kansas jurisdiction.65 Contrary to reali-
ty,66 each class member is presumed to have received, read, un-
derstood and consciously reacted to the court's notice. In this
guise, the turn-of-the-century fiction of "implied consent" re-
turns.
67
My idea' of a "power versus contacts" reciprocity offers a more
rational road to an otherwise wise result. On the left side of the
balance, the "power" weight is minimal. Class members are asked
to surrender to Kansas courts a power to deprive each of $100:68
a small rendering. On the "contacts" side we have each class
member's affiliation with a nationwide company entering into hun-
dreds of similar contracts touching many or all states. By choosing
to do business with an interstate dealer, one locks into a nation-
wide approach to resolving common disputes against the company.
This is essentially a mirror image of the Burger King69 approach
63. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages
without notice and prior hearing violates due process); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) j(right to a hearing when welfare payments are discontinued). Cf. United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14
(1973) ('small" enough stake for standing).
64. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (fictitious cor-
porate consent); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205-07 (1977) (fictional treatment of
suit as against property and not property owners); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328
(1980) (double fiction of situs of debt and corporate presence).
65. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 820.
66. People are likely to ignore or misunderstand class action notices. See Arthur R.
Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 321 (1973) (arguing a
typical citizen does not notice or understand court process).
67. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (implied consent to service on
registrar of motor vehicles).
68. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 809.
69. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (defendant -estab-
lished ... a relationship with Burger King's Miami headquarters").
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where the defendant "enters" the forum state legalistically, that is,
by means of legal ties to another who is located there. Since com-
pames like Phillips Petroleum are subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of almost all states,7" its lessees "contract into" the scenario
of nationwide class actions. The affiliation of these customers with
Kansas is by virtue of their contracting partner's presence in all
states. While the "contact" weight was small because the affiliation
was both minimal and indirect, the "power" weight was even
smaller because Phillips Petroleum was a small claim class action.
Hence, using this Lockean analysis, jurisdiction is fair.
V FINE TUNING THE BALANCE
A. First Level Analysis: Sizing the Weights
If the in personam defense is a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest, as has been declared by the Court,71 then the Lockean
reciprocity analysis, wich balances power versus contacts to deter-
mine fairness, must be the primary consideration. Only in close
cases should other factors, unrelated to Locke's contractual concept,
affect the liberty interest. In other words, if the primary function of
the doctrine of personal jurisdiction is to evaluate the fairness of a
forum in terms of defendant's forum affiliations, matters unrelated
to that measure could operate only in cases of doubt about the
primary balance.'
In this first section I shall discuss the "size" of the weights in
order to evaluate the primary balance. In developing the Lockean
theory and testing it with my students, I have used the simple
expedient of differently sized "power" and "contact" weights.73
70. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. 797.
71. !g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982) (The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an indi-
vidual liberty interest.").
72. Tis will displease those who care to emphasize other social needs and values. Yet
I am not restructuring the Shoe doctrine in tus essay, but only rendering comprehensible
the Court's current calculus.
73. In this part I am trying to avoid the balancer's trap of "some undisclosed scale of
social value" and to ground my weights in "lustory, tradition and current [societal inter-
ests]." See T. Alexander Alemikoff, Constitutional Law in an Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
LJ. 943, 986, 962-63 (1987).
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An example of a "small power" weight would be the Court's "do
not take the children" restraining order issued against Dr. Kulko.74
At the other extreme, both the award of custody and the imposition
of considerable annual support payments in Kulko75 would qualify
as "large power" weights. The former involves significant family
emotional concerns, while the latter is a constant sizeable economic
obligation backed by contempt sanctions. Between these two ex-
tremes are the normal petitions, the unexceptional cases which
cluster about the median.
In making the "power" evaluation, our universe is the infinity
of American court orders, and we are judging how onerous such
orders would be perceived by a normal litigant. In Lockean terms,
being subject to court orders is the contribution expected of a
citizen by his state. In the gray areas we will certainly debate what
size weights are appropriate, but that does not make the process
invalid, just subjective.76
I have no qualms about upsizing or downsizing the power
weight to account for the burden of a foreign defense. Forcing a
person to litigate in a distant place is part of the "demand" placed
on a subject by the community's court and therefore makes up part
74. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 88 n.2 (1978). The restraining order at
issue appeared only to be temporary in nature; if it were permanent, it would amount to
a form of custody and arguably would be a "large power" exercise.
75. Id. at 88.
76. Curiously, however, my students and I can normally agree on how onerous a given
order may be.
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of the "power" weight.7 In cases where a small claim is filed in
77. As previously stated, the Supreme Court has frequently insisted that contacts are to
be measured against the "burden of a foreign defense." See sources cited supra notes 41-
42 and accompanying text. However, one case, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984), also considers the total damages sought as "certainly relevant to the
jurisdictional inquiry." Id. at 775. Keeton was seeking to have the New Hampshire courts
collect her libel damages in all states. The Court admitted that:
the contacts between respondent and New Hampshire must be such that it' is
"fair" to compel respondent to defend a multi-state lawsuit in New Hampshire
seeking nationwide damages for all copies of the five issues [of Hustler] in
question, even though a small portion of the copies were distributed in New
Hampshire. Id.









I would have to ascertain other additional powerful considerations, unrelated to the con-
tacts-power reciprocity, to "load up" the balance's right side. The Keeton court may have
found these in the need for an interstate collection system. See id. at 777 ("New
Hamphire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with other States"). But a more
likely explanation is that the Court reached its result by using loaded rhetoric to exagger-
ate Hustler's contacts with New Hampshire. Id. at 781, 774 ("continuously and deliberate-
ly exploited"; "regular monthly sales of thousands of magazines"). Transposing the Court's










I conclude that while describing the "power" factor in my terms, the Keeton court attrib-
uted little importance to it. Consequently, at bottom the Lockean reciprocity is not to be
found there.
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a distant, inconvenient court, such burden may be the principal part








The "contacts" analysis poses a more complex sizing problem.
What is the relevant universe for a comparative assessment of
contacts? The reciprocity concept appears most frequently in cases
of non-residents challenging the power of a state court, and the
Court often describes Shoe as the doctrine for determining jurisdic-
tion over such defendants."8 This tempts me to assess relative de-
grees of non-resident contacts. Yet the jurisdictional liberty interest
is held by all parties subject to state court power: residents and
non-residents, citizens and foreigners, 9 plaintiffs and defendants.
Furthermore, reciprocity-as-fairness is a neutral principle ready
to test any "subject's" claim of unmerited assertions of community
power. Just because we are unaccustomed to Shoe challenges when
the defendant is a permanent resident and domiciliary of the forum
state does not mean that the formula is not implicitly at work. We
therefore conclude that the relevant universe is that of all defen-
dants and not some subset thereof. We can again use the sizings
"small," "normal" and "large", measured by benefits reaped and
risks created, with flexibility to assess an "extraordinary" situation
with extremely sized weights.
78. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)
(power to render a valid personal judgment against "a nonresident defendant"); Kulko, 436
U.S. at 91 ("judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresidents-).
79. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (Japanese corpo-
ration was sued in a California state court).
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The quantitatively normal case is that of the resident-domicili-
ary or the domestic corporation (or qualified foreign corporation)
sued in its "home" state. The constant "presence" or "activity,"
respectively, of this type of defendant indicates a sizable quantity







In sizing this weight, we cannot help but have the left-sided
"power" weight in mind. As in any other legal "calculation" we
can cheat to attain pre-determined results. For example, we know
that state courts do and must enter a wide range of remedial orders
against their resident individuals and businesses. Because the range
of permissible left-side "power" is determined by our assessment of
the weight of right side "contacts," and vice-versa, wherever we
start we are conscious of the "other side."
This potential "loading" of the weights does not trouble me.
The honest evaluator has a reasonably objective reference for bas-
ing his evaluation: on one side, comparing the relief sought with
"normal" scenarios, and on the other, judging this defendant's
forum-state contacts against the universe of defendant contacts.
Both assessments can be made independently of each other.
Also hard to imagine is how or why a person inclined to cheat
would pre-ordain a result. What in personam formula would be at
the back of the "cheater's" mind? Some different Shoe analysis? If
so, the decisionmaker is not abusing the reciprocity-as-fairness
concept; he is simply not using it. Any predisposition or prejudg-
ment by a user of the reciprocity formula is merely a subconscious
run-through of the balance, capable of being perfected or perhaps
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supplanted by more mature consideration.
The simplicity and elegance of the power-versus-contacts reci-
procity makes planning feasible for cases in which the contacts are
in the making and liabilities only potential. The Court has often
spoken of defendants being able to "reasonably foresee" a particu-
lar Shoe result, or having had "fair notice" of such result, or hav-
ing engaged in "purposive" acts.8" These pronouncements mean
that the defendant could have predicted (and avoided) the forum's
power assertion, which is ludicrous in light of the Court's shape-
less doctrine. When the courts themselves are splitting constantly
and widely in these cases, the defendants in them could never
confidently predict a result. In comparison, the straightforward
"power versus contacts" reciprocity does enable some real corporate
planning to occur. A foreign company like Asahi can assess its
commerce with United States customers and calculate with some
assurance the jurisdictional effects of raising or lowering its stream
of commerce.8 1 Similarly, a single automobile dealer could be ad-
vised of its jurisdictional exposure should it wish to develop an
interstate clientele.
Yet if several wild cards were inserted in the deck, each capa-
ble of producing a sudden reversal of fortune, then predictability
and planning would be impossible. The "other factors" inventoried
in World-Wide Volkswagen, 2 such as the interests of the forum
state and the plaintiff's need for a forum, 3 could "trump" the
basic fairness calculation and lead to unexpected results.
80. E.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (1992) (discussing
question of whether foreign state "purposefully availed" itself of a United States forum);
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109 (determining that Asahi had not "purposefully availed" itself of
privileges to conduct business in forum state); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 474, 484 (1985) (discussion of foreseeability and that the contract provision constitut-
ed "fair notice" of possibility of personal jurisdiction); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774
(distribution of several thousand magazines within forum state amounted to "purposefully
directed" conduct which satisfied requirements of due process); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (shareholders do not "purposefully avail" themselves of forum state
by owning stock in corporation chartered there; nor by owning such stock would they
have "reason to expect" that the state would have jurisdiction over them); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (introduction of "purposeful availment" as test for
minimum contacts).
81. The degree of confusion surrounding current "minimum contacts" doctrine was
based on Asahi's quite believable claim that, although a significant number of its valve
assemblies made their way to California, the company never contemplated the possibility
of being subject to suit there. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107.
82. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
83. Id. at 292.
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B. Second Level Analysis: Other Unrelated Factors
An understanding of the application of Lockean theory to per-
sonal jurisdiction takes us smoothly to a sensible handling of "jok-
ers." They can only enter cases in which the initial power versus
contacts balance is close. Because this reciprocity is the measure of
fairness, unrelated matters such as state and interstate needs must
stay backstage. That is, they are usable only when the basic bal-
ance is in doubt. If liberty is the core interest, we can only consid-
er other unrelated interests (the "other factors") when such will not
distort the liberty balance. In this I may differ from readers who
wish these other interests to exercise greater control over
defendant's liberty, or who see in the cases a more complex inter-
weaving of relevant Shoe factors. From my reading of the cases, I




















In general, a primary imbalance between power and contacts
cannot be "righted" using these secondary weights. Such a conclu-
sion is mandatory once we accept the predominance of the liberty
interest. Thus, the secondary weights must stay out of play when
either of the following is the initial balance:
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If the "other factors" weigh in the same direction as the prima-
ry imbalance, a court will want to "cement" the decision by dis-
cussing these other factors.8 4 The danger of such makeweight ar-
gumentation is that it falsely implies that had these factors pointed
in the other direction, they could, have tipped the balance the other
way. Because of this danger, courts should avoid such pedantry.85
Conversely, the cases "in balance" must call upon these other
considerations for their resolution. The reader must recall that in
cases of equipoise the opposing factors balance out, leaving the
court in complete doubt about how to decide the matter.86 The
court must turn to these other considerations to break the impasse,
including the occasional use of a "tipping" weight cast against the
plaintiff when all considerations have washed out.87 Such might
be the following.
84. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-16 (deciding whether or not to assert jurisdiction
because of other factors such as the burden on the defendant, interests of the forum state,
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, or the interstate judicial system's interest).
85. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 n.* (1992) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) ("An easy case is especially likely to make bad law when it is unnecessarily
transformed into a hard case.").
86. See supra text accompanying note 46.
87. Here I merely follow traditional learning that the plaintiff, in seeking to assert
court power, must demonstrate his entitlement thereto. E.g., Theunissen v. Matthews, 935
F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that
the court has jurisdiction).
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The hard cases would be when there is neither equipoise nor a
large imbalance: a "normal" weight on one side and a "large" or
"small" one on the other. Could the other factors tip the scale back





Unfortunately, I cannot answer this question because I do not know
just how secondary these "other factors" are. Predictability and
judicial efficiency (including reducing the number and size of Shoe
opinions) would be served by a narrow use of these other matters,
calling upon them only when the power-contacts weights are in
equipoise. The neatness of that solution, however, would naturally
disserve these other interests. How much of Pennoyer's interstate
federalism interest (territoriality) remains is an open question. The
amount of concern for the plaintiff's jurisdictional needs, if any, is
1992]
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an unexplored matter. How much weight to give a state's disinter-
est in a particular litigation or vice-versa is unclear.
Part of the problem is that the Court's opinions have rarely
played these factors against each other; rather, the typical Court
opinion, like Burger King, has involved serial incantations of the
"tests" and poorly explained conclusions based upon them.8 8 For
now, I will assume that the Court's continued use of these "other
factors" means they do have more than marginal significance. For
example, even if Asahi's California sales were direct and signifi-
cant, a healthy percentage of its total international sales, the "other
factors" might still tip the scale against Chen Shin in the indemnity










VI. A LOOK AT THE SUBDOCTRINES
A. Foreseeability
The Court is so open to criticism on the foreseeability topic
that I hesitate to cover it. Yet I do so for the sake of a generation
of confused students. The Court opinions have often couched fair-
ness in terms of the defendant's state of mind: whether it "pur-
posefully" entered the forum state,89 or whether it could have
"reasonably anticipated" a pro-jurisdiction Shoe result.9°
88. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-78 (1985) (analysis in-
cluded numerous string quotations from precedents).
89. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (noting that an essential
element to asserting personal jurisdiction is that the defendant purposefully availed himself
of the forum state's privileges).
90. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (discussing whether the defendant would
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In evaluating this language against the Lockean citizen-state
bargain,9 t we immediately draw some apparent conclusions. One
is that the citizen's state of mind is irrelevant because Locke's
philosophical-political construct does not depend upon any party's
specific intent or understanding of the consequences which flow
from the specific act giving rise to the cause of action. 2 There
must be only some conscious "affiliating" act of the citizen, some
act of joinder with the community.93 This theory of consent is
the very predicate for a Lockean surrender of autonomy by the
individual.95
This is consistent with the Court's insistence that there be
some purposeful act of the defendant directed toward the forum
state.96 Yet, any resulting "bargain" between a defendant and fo-
rum state identified by a court is purely conceptual, "fairness"
being not a product of a defendant's affirmative, volitional choice
but instead an intellectual construct superimposed by the court
upon actual relationships. Regardless of an individual's conception
of the jurisdictional consequences of his actions, a court analyzes
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court" (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) ("no
reason to expect" state would have jurisdiction).
91. In creating or joining a society, man relinquishes part of his natural liberty for the
good, prosperity, and safety of the society. LOCKE, supra note 10 at 71. In return, society
agrees to safeguard each individual's property and to resolve disputes fairly, limiting its
power to the public good of the community. Id. at 75.
92. For instance, when by inheritance or purchase, an individual takes possession of
real property, Locke assunes that it is taken on condition that the individual submit to
the governed under whose jurisdiction the property is. Id. at 68.
93. However, this affiliating act need not take the form of an explicit expression. Ac-
cording to Locke,
every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions
of any government doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth
obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoy-
ment . . .whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs forever,
or a lodging only for a week.
Id. at 67.
94. Because men are "by nature all free, equal and independent," an individual could
not be subjected to the political power of any governmental authority unless that individu-
al had voluntarily joined together with other men, uniting into a community. Id. at 54.
95. As part of the original compact, this consensual surrender of autonomy obligates
each individual member of that society to submit to the determination of the majority and
to be "concluded" by it. Id. at 55.
96. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (in-
sisting, on due process grounds, than an action of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum state is necessary for minimum contacts); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (asserting that "fair warning" is satisfied when defendant
has purposefully directed his activities toward the forum state).
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them retrospectively and then makes a determination as to whether
a bargain was, in fact, present which would justify the jurisdiction
demanded by the state.
"Foreseeability" is pegged to an individual's ability to under-
stand the consequences of his action, specifically, of his activities
within the forum state. Without a clearly defined and articulated
jurisdiction doctrine, no individual or entity can possibly foresee
such consequences. Because the Supreme Court has offered no
such comprehensible doctrine, any discussion in cases of "foresee-
ability" seems absurd. How could any defendant foresee an exten-
sion of jurisdiction when in personam case law is like a black
hole?
No defendant, however, can shield himself from personal juris-
diction by asserting the incoherence of Shoe and its predecessors.
Whether the defendant did or should have anticipated the Shoe
effects the courts later adjudicate is irrelevant. Instead, in keeping
with Lockean analysis, as long as the affiliating act is consciously
taken, the actor should be held responsible for the legal effects of
this affiliating act, even the unpredictable ones. For example, in
applying this analysis to Asahi, it is irrelevant that Asahi "has
never contemplated that its limited sales of tire valves to Cheng
Shin in Taiwan would subject it to lawsuits in California," as
declared by Asahi's president.97 Instead, the volitional act should
serve as the foundation, and not an individual's cognizance of
expected consequences.
B. "Arising Out Of"
Forum courts normally, and perhaps invariably, have jurisdic-
tion when the defendant's liability-causing conduct occurs within
the territorial boundaries of the government in which the court sits.
When a cause of action specifically relates to activities of the
defendant directed at the forum, it is accepted that due process
does not prevent the forum from exercising jurisdiction. In Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court distinguished
between causes of action generated by a defendant's conduct in the
forum and those claims unrelated to the defendant's forum-directed
activities.9" As long as the defendant acted within the forum to
97. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107.
98. The Court wrote that a defendant's "single or isolated items of activities in a
state . are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the
activities there.- 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (emphasis added). However, in that case, the
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cause the controversy, the forum is entitled to exercise jurisdiction
based on the state's interest in regulating conduct within its bor-
ders." This theme was honed in the court's most notable "arising
out of" case, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,1"o where
the court accepted as jurisdictionally sufficient one single contract
that the defendant had with a resident of the forum state.' 0'
Under Locke's theory, this type of consensual connection to a
forum state naturally carries with it jurisdictional consequences.
The Lockean premise entails a transfer from individual to commu-
nity of power to create and enforce laws, regardless of whether the
individual associates himself with that community temporarily or
permanently."° Neighbors are mutually constrained because the
organs of government have promulgated general norms of permissi-
ble conduct and stand ready to enforce them.° Extending these
principles, it is precisely the creation and enforcement of communi-
ty norms which occurs when a court is requested to exercise "juris-
diction" - the power to speak the law.
This "bargain" between an individual and community makes
extending jurisdiction in "arising out of" cases fair. In these situ-
ations the harmful consequences to plaintiff have directly "arisen
out of" actions which defendant voluntarily took in the forum state.
Here reciprocity is plain. Just as an individual expects his neigh-
bors to submit to their society's relief institutions, which enforce
rules governing all entities interacting with that society, these
neighbors can anticipate that the individual too -will be required to
respond to their society's enforcement agent. Therefore, applying
Lockean principles, claims which arise from the defendant's forum
contacts should be resolved for the plaintiff at the jurisdiction level
because it would be fair for the community to exercise sufficient
power to adjudicate the alleged violations of its norms by the de-
fendant. In terms of the balancing analysis, in "arising out of'
cases, the contacts weight would be larger than the power weight.
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. illustrates how ex-
tending jurisdiction in "arising out of case" is fair when considered
defendant's activities had given rise to the cause of action and furthermore, the
defendant's overall contacts were considered continuous and systematic. Id. at 320.
99. See id. at 319.
100. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
101. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
102. See LOCKE, supra note 10, at 94-95 (transfer of "political power" from man to
governors so that the latter can "make laws and annex ...penalties").
103. Id.
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in terms of Lockean reciprocity. The record in that case disclosed
no contacts between the defendant, or its predecessor, and the
California forum besides the one life insurance policy sub judi-
ce. t°4 A Lockean analysis focuses upon the "entry" of the defen-
dant into California and its reaping of benefits from that state's
structure of laws and institutions. California law determined wheth-
er a binding "acceptance" of the offer to insure had occurred. The
Texas insurance company could have, indisputably, sought a judg-
ment in California against the insured, Lowell Franklin, for arrears
in payments, thereby using California law and courts. Indeed, we
can presume that Lowell Franklin made timely payment of the
premiums because of the pressure of California's legal norms.
The reciprocity in McGee is now clear. Because International
Life Insurance Company benefited, both potentially and actually,
from California law and institutions, it must dutifully respond in
kind. Notice how difficult it becomes for the defendant to use a
paucity of contacts as a shield against California jurisdiction (i.e.,
that only a single, small contract is insufficient). The court, in Lulu
McGee's suit for the policy proceeds, is only claiming the power
to adjudicate and enforce rights under that single, small contract.
The perfect reciprocity surges from the perfect coincidence between
acts of entry and the boundaries of the lawsuit. We now have put
life into Justice Black's barren rationale in McGee that the "con-
tract . . . had substantial connection with that state . ... "105
Is "arising out of' therefore an absolute factor such that juris-
diction always should be established? The question assumes the
asserted liability springs directly from the defendant's forum state
action and is not merely "related to" such action."°6 Although I
would prefer a positive answer for the sake of doctrinal simplicity,
I would defer to complexity justified by sound policy.
Let us approach the problem by using an extreme hypothetical
- the traditional testing ground of absolute propositions. Imagine a
car crossing the corner of State X. The driver, D, sees a "State X"
104. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-22.
105. Id. at 223.
106. Justice Brennan pushed, unsuccessfully, for a broader test that looked for forum
contacts "related to" the litigation rather than a test that looked to litigation that "arose
out of" the forum contacts. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 420 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For discussion on the relatedness of contacts
that, in turn, implicates state sovereignty interests see Brilmayer, How Contacts Count,
supra note 1 (discussing the distinction between "related" and "unrelated" contacts).
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sign and cannot assert that he unconsciously entered that jurisdic-
tion. The passage is brief - five minutes - but within that inter-
lude D makes fraudulent material misrepresentations to P, his pas-
senger. Six months later P acts upon the representations to his det-
riment in distant State Y where both parties are domiciliary-resi-
dents. D, the driver, had no other contacts with State X. Can P sue
D there?
The answer is positive, of course, if judged only in terms of
my proposition that "arising out of' is justice, but we must account
for any contrary pulls. First, State X's interest in the matter is only
in the enforcement of its fraud rules. Next, because the harm actu-
ally occurred in distant State Y where P detrimentally relied, D is
suable in State Y. The distance, then, will make the defense bur-
densome. Yet neither of these two counter-considerations strike me
as particularly weighty.
The fact that D is suable in State Y does not undercut the
legitimacy of State X's claim over the episode within its borders; it
means merely that D, a traveler, has jurisdictionally relevant affilia-
tions with several locales. The fact that State Y might use its con-
flicts rules to reach and apply State X's substantive law is a weak
substitute for the surer application by State X itself. If the defense
must travel it is only because D himself traveled. I conclude, there-
fore, that even in extreme cases, "arising out of' points to fairness
and no sound policy indicates otherwise.
C. General Jurisdiction
In the hypothetical used in the previous section, what if anoth-
er plaintiff, domiciliary-resident of State Y, uses the distant courts
of State X to sue D for breach of a contract concluded and broken
in State Y9. The only affiliation of State X with the litigation is that
one of the parties, D, once drove through there for five minutes,
allegedly defrauding another in that span of time.. Based on that
solitary event can a court of State X fairly assume jurisdiction over
this breach of contract claim?
The Supreme Court would use the sub-doctrines of "specific"
and "general" jurisdiction to address the problem. 7 This is an-
107. Specific jurisdiction is a doctrine designed to limit a court's authority to controver-
sies relating to or arising out of a defendant's contacts with the forum, even if the cause
of action is based on a single act of the defendant. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom-
bia v. Hall, the court recognized the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984). General
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other dark comer of Shoe jurisprudence. Once again we encounter
the problem of rudderless guessing about -when the contacts will be
enough to constitute fairness.
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.' we learn
that a foreign corporation can do enough business in a particular
locale that it is suable there on unrelated claims."° Unfortunately,
the Court's analysis in Perkins casts no light on fairness. Quoting
language from International Shoe, the Court tested the defendant's
Ohio contacts against two phrases, "sufficiently substantial" and "of
such a nature," without bothering to clarify their purpose and
meaning."o Like Shoe itself, Perkins describes the particular con-
tacts and concludes simply that Ohio would not violate the
defendant's due process rights by assuming jurisdiction."1
These criticisms are not overstated; the Perkins decision offered
no guidance for evaluating other types and degrees of contacts.
Thirty-two years later, despite a span of continuous "refinements,"
the Court in Helicopteros still failed to clarify the standardless
general jurisdiction analysis when it concluded that defendant
Helicol's contacts with Texas did not represent the kind of "contin-
uous and systematic general business contacts" that the Perkins
court identified."' Without an underlying conceptual philosophy
for its reasoning, the Court in Helicopteros engaged in a form of
contacts analysis that earlier had been belittled by the Shoe court
as "mechanical" jurisprudence." 3 It merely compared defendant
Helicol's Texas contacts with those contacts which the Philippine
mining company (the Perkins defendant) had with the forum
Ohio.14 Why this "lesser" quantum of contacts was not enough
jurisdiction analyzes the amount and kind of contacts that the defendant has with the fo-
rum state, and requires that these contacts be "continuous and systematic" in order to
justify entertaining claims arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities with-
in the forum state. See id. at 415; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952) (considered as the seminal case on general jurisdiction).
108. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
109. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-46.
110. See id. at 447.
111. See id. at 447-48; see infra note 114 for a description of these contacts.
112. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
113. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (stating that the criteria used to
determine personal jurisdiction should not be mechanically applied).
114. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16. The Court in Perkins determined that the
defendant had actively carried on company business in Ohio by maintaining an office,
holding meetings, dispatching correspondence, and distributing payroll checks drawn on
local banks. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. Yet in Helicopteros the Court found the
defendant's contacts to be more isolated even though the company CEO had made a
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for general jurisdiction was not articulated with any precision, apart
from the unexplained conclusion that "mere purchases, even if oc-
curring at regular intervals, are not enough." 15 This mysterious
process, which Justice Brennan unhelpfully called a "weighing of
facts,"" 6 merely shifts the dilemma to another context. How
much, then, is "enough" when the claim does not arise from the
forum contacts?
What is troublesome in these cases is that the forum is exercis-
ing a power over the defendant which is truly extraordinary: judg-
ing the lawfulness of his activity outside the jurisdiction's bound-
aries. One naturally expects to have one's conduct judged by the
laws and judicial bodies of the territory where one acts. An indi-
vidual driving or contracting in State Y would not expect that the
substantive laws or conflict rules of State X would apply to
him.
117
Individuals accustomed to living in civilization understand that
different states and countries have different laws. Regardless of
their familiarity with the specific foreign laws, transitory individu-
als also expect that, while physically present in foreign territory,
they are obliged to comply with the laws and government there.
Even after their departure, these individuals probably realize they
will be subject to the corpus of foreign laws respecting conse-
quences of their past conduct within the foreign territory. This
natural expectation is not fulfilled when "foreign" judges act and
"foreign" laws are applied, meaning officials and rules foreign to
the place where the actual conduct occurred.
purchasing trip to Texas, Helicol's employees were to be trained in Texas, and Helicol
habitually accepted checks drawn on Texas banks. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416 (in
addition, emphasizing Helicol's lack of control over the selection of its payors' financial
institution).
115. Id. at 418.
116. Id. at 419 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (Marshall, .,
dissenting) (the "facts of each case must be weighed7)); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101-02
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. The Supreme Court has weakly controlled a forum's application of its own laws in
litigation with multi-state connections. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,
723 (1988) (holding that the "Full Faith and Credit" clause was not violated when the
state applied its own statute of limitation despite having applied the substantive law of
another state); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) (stating that the
Court's role is only to ensure that the Minnesota Supreme Court did not exceed the limits
of the Constitution in applying its choice-of-law rules). But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (concluding that the application of the forum state's law
exceeded constitutional limits and thus the forum state could not apply its law to out-of-
state transactions).
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In addition, such "foreign" exercises of power exceed that
conceded to the community in the Lockean compact."' 8 Take for
example, one form of general jurisdiction, "home base" jurisdiction
(i.e., the defendant's domicile). 119 Assume one is now back "at
home" where the primary Lockean compact is in force, keeping in
mind that as he travels afar he enters into temporary Lockean
agreements, philosophically speaking, each time he passes a fron-
tier. Why would one, as a philosophical bargainer, concede to his
home base the power to judge his conduct abroad? Concededly,
while one is abroad home base jurisdiction continues to protect
what he leaves behind, but its ordered liberty does not travel with
him. There is no "police escort," so to speak. Having abandoned
one's security to others, the home base cannot fairly assume the
power to judge that individual's conduct abroad.
As illustrated by the above discussion, the forum state has
given you nothing with respect to the transactions or events un-
derlying the particular litigation to justify its power exercise. Ap-
plying this reasoning to all "general jurisdiction" I conclude that
this type of jurisdiction (as opposed to that of "arising out of") is
generally unreciprocal and, consequently, generally unfair. Indeed,
the proponents of "general jurisdiction" often emphasize other
factors over fairness to the defendant. 2 ° They subtly seem to cast
their eyes either upon courts or plaintiffs. t2
If the comfort of courts is the goal, we should simply return to
the surer Pennoyer doctrines. The Supreme Court, itself, however,
has explicitly rejected the argument favoring the certainty of in rem
jurisdiction despite the "uncertainty inherent in the International
Shoe standard."' 23 In addition, the premise that general jurisdic-
tion should be allowed for judicial expediency is flawed because
118. "[No one can be . . . subjected to the political power of another without his own
consent" which is given by agreeing, through a compact, to join a society with other men
for their mutual benefit. LocKE, supra note 10, at 54.
119. See generally Twitchell, Myth, supra note 1 at 667-70 (advocating limiting general
jurisdiction to the defendant's "home base').
120. See, e.g., id. at 665-66 (1988) (listing problems which would result from the elimi-
nation of general jurisdiction, none of which consider fairness to the defendant).
121. See, e.g., id. at 666. (According to Professor Twitchell elimination of general juris-
diction would decrease judicial efficiency.).
122. See, e.g., id. at 667 ("The best approach to general jurisdiction is to confine it to
its most essential function: providing one forum where a defendant may always be
sued.").
123. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977) ('the cost of simplifying . . . may
be the sacrifice of 'fair play and substantial justice").
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general jurisdiction is not a doctrine which is comfortably applied.
How much contact, -then, is enough for general jurisdiction? Gener-
al jurisdiction cases like Helicopteros and Perkins, even considered
together, do not provide a clear answer.
If fairness to plaintiffs lurks behind general jurisdiction, I re-
mind readers that Shoe focused on the defendant's liberty, not his
adversary's. 24 Moreover, the plaintiff already has the choice be-
tween the place where the defendant's illegal conduct occurred and
the place where the damage occurred. The first choice, "arising out
of" usually should be fair."2 The second choice is fair because
defendants are normally accountable for both causes and effects of
their actions.1 26 That the plaintiff should be offered yet another
forum is not a defensible proposition.
I conclude that "general jurisdiction," meaning a forum foreign
to the defendant's conduct, is almost always unfair and thus should
rarely - if ever - be asserted. Notice how this conclusion is not
only morally and philosophically advantageous, but is also efficient
because many general jurisdiction cases can be disposed of easily
as unfair. I use the qualifier "almost always," however, because in
the wonderful world of International Shoe one can never engage in
Pennoyer-type absolutes. 127 The following discussion will illus-
trate how some general jurisdiction cases are fair because there has
been "actual" and "valid" consent.
D. Consent and Waiver
1. Actual and Valid Consent Is Always Fair
Given that Lockean fairness is based upon the philosophical
bargain, actual valid consent to a state's jurisdiction must be
124. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
125. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text (discussing how the reciprocal rela-
tionship between the defendant and the forum state means invariably that jurisdiction is
fair).
126. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (holding that a manufacturer located in Ohio and incorporated in
Pennsylvania can be sued in Illinois for a products liability claim since the plaintiff was
injured there).
127. Except for Justice Scalia. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). In
Burnham, the husband, a resident of New Jersey, contested personal jurisdiction because
he had been served with a divorce petition while visiting his children in California. 495
U.S. at 608. Scalia's plurality opinion held that the husband's physical presence alone
subjected him to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 619. For discussion as to why such "absolut-
ist' jurisdiction using mere domicile or service of process is unfair under Locke, see infra
notes 139-62 and accompanying text.
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
deemed just per se."s This is because a "deal" has been struck
between a party and the state. In other words, a party voluntarily
has conceded its power to a state's court in exchange for certain
benefits. The consent of the party, then, means the bargain is actu-
al and valid and not just philosophical. Thus, the assertion of these
states' jurisdiction over the party will always be fair.
The act of a foreign corporation registering to do business in a
particular state is a vivid illustration of such an actual agreement.
If the state's law defines the jurisdictional effects of the
corporation's registration to do business, then the registration is a
formal bargain with the state.'29 The corporation's attorneys will
have judged the costs and benefits, including the jurisdictional
implications, of qualifying to do business in that state as compared
to other states. Having "signed on" in that state, the corporation
has agreed to submit to any lawsuit permitted by that state's law.
Moreover, this consent even includes state court jurisdiction over
claims totally unrelated to the company's business within the fo-
rum.
30
Sometimes a state's corporation laws merely require the ap-
pointment of an agent to receive process without any further ex-
planation of the jurisdictional consequences of such an appoint-
ment.' 3 1 Courts of that state may read consent to suit into such
statutes. 3 2 Once that judicial gloss is incorporated into the stat-
ute, it would seem fair, despite being burdensome, to read consent-
to-suit into the act of corporate registration.' 3
128. I use the qualifiers "actual" and "valid" because here, as elsewhere, courts may
look beneath the surface of the bargain and invalidate the act of consent for either real or
constructive involuntariness.
129. See generally Developments, supra note 1, at 920 (discussing the necessity for a
corporation to consent expressly in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction as a condi-
tion of doing business in a state).
130. Thus, we see how actual consent makes "general" jurisdiction possible. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95 (1917)
(holding that suit could be brought against the defendant in Missouri on a claim relating
to an insurance contract in force in Colorado because the defendant had agreed that, in
exchange for being allowed to do business in Missouri, its Missouri Insurance Superin-
tendent would accept service on its behalf).
131. See infra text accompanying note 146.
132. See, e.g., Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. American Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 88,
90 (Minn. 1991) (construing a corporation's consent to service of process through an
agent to mean consent to personal jurisdiction).
133. Arguably, the first corporation to suffer such consequence might have a decent
Chevron Oil prospectivity claim. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107-08
(1971) (deciding against a retroactive application of a statute of limitations law).
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Consent, however, most often appears in private party bargains
by means of forum selection clauses." In such cases the
defendant's bargain with the forum is at most indirect because the
bargained benefits come from another party through the contract,
and not from the forum itself. This is not, however, a hurdle be-
cause we can reconceptualize the situation as a waiver of a right.
The personal jurisdiction defense is a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment that can be knowingly and voluntarily
waived. 35 When agreeing to a forum selection clause, each sign-
er manifests a willingness to waive certain dispute-related rights,
which would otherwise be claimable, in exchange for the benefits
of doing business with the other party. Consequently, the fact that
the signer has received no correlative benefits from the forum state
is irrelevant.
2. Domicile in a State Is Not Always Actual and Valid Consent
A harder consent case is when personal jurisdiction is solely
based on domicile."t Arguably, merely establishing domicile is
not the same as actually and validly consenting to be subject to a
state's jurisdiction. Using domicile alone to establish personal juris-
diction means the jurisdiction will be "general" when the claim did
not arise out of any contact with the forum state.'37 Unlike a cor-
poration registering to do business in a forum state, usually a State
X domiciliary knows nothing of state laws concerning court juris-
diction. 3
8
E. The "Absolutes": Domicile and Service of Process
Not only has domicile been equated with consent to personal
jurisdiction, courts often deem domicile, as well as service of pro-
134. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (upholding
a contract's forum selection clause that required suit to be brought in Florida even though
the passenger, who had purchased his ticket in Washington, was injured off the coast of
Mexico).
135. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702-03 (1982) (noting that personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, can
be waived).
136. This discussion is not necessarily limited to domicile. Conceivably it might extend
to citizenship and residence.
137. See Twitchell, Myth, supra note 1, at 667 (advocating elimination of all general
jurisdiction except that based on the defendant's "home base"). See also supra note 119
and accompanying text (discussing why one form of general jurisdiction, "home base"
jurisdiction, is unfair).
138. Probably the majority of the tiny subset of state X domiciliaries who are familiar
with state jurisdiction laws are civil procedure professors.
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cess, sufficient per se to invoke personal jurisdiction. Lockean
analysis will demonstrate that such an absolutist approach is unfair.
1. Domicile
Because the Lockean reciprocity is at the root of fair play, and
because such reciprocity involves an assessment of the defendant's
forum state relations in light of the state court's demands upon that
person, it would seem imperative that the facts of each particular
litigation be individually assessed. Hence, an absolutist approach to
domicile would be unfair.
Take for example, Milliken v. Meyer,139 which held that the
defendant's domicile in the forum state was sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction despite the defendant's lack of continuous
presence in that state1 4° Justice Douglas created an absolute rule:
"One . . . incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the
state even during sojourns without the state . . . . ""' While this
absolutist approach has the advantage of simplicity, 42 this sim-
plicity sacrifices accuracy. This is because domicile is merely a
legal construct based upon certain affiliations between defendant
and his country or his state; a construct needed for purposes alien
to the personal jurisdiction inquiry. One thinks of Justice
Frankfurter's critique of transferring into the Erie field the "sub-
stance versus procedure" distinctions made in other branches of the
law. 14
3
The advantage of eliminating domicile as a Shoe relevancy is
that we will not stumble over domicile complexities which serve
no Shoe function. For example, an individual may permanently
leave State X while technically maintaining a domicile there be-
cause he has yet to select a domicile elsewhere. 44 His State X
contacts fade with each passing day. While he continues to be
suable in State X for any lingering effects of his presence there,
what justifies State X's continuing power over him for his actions
139. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
140. Id. at 464.
141. Id.
142. A few responses to well-chosen questions at the defendant's deposition may be
enough to fix a forum domicile irrefutably.
143. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945) (rejecting a "sub-
stance versus procedure" distinction as the proper test for determining whether to apply a
state statute of limitations to federal law).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15 cmt. b, illus. 2, and
cml. c (1969) (discussing the effects of moving on domicile).
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and effects outside State X? Certainly the technicality of a continu-
ing domicile cannot supply the fairness quotient.
Consider less extreme cases in which the defendant acts outside
the locus of domicile, returns, and is sued at home on those acts.
If the plaintiff cannot prove fairness based on a Perkins-type as-
sessment of defendant-domiciliary's unrelated forum contacts, then
no reason appears for why domicile should trump such an assess-
ment. Domicile adds nothing to the defendant's act nor does it
lessen the power exercised by the forum court. In sum, "domicile"
is extraneous to the Shoe balance. It is merely a shorthand expres-
sion for certain quantums of forum state contact, for certain bene-
fits (e.g., right to vote), and for certain duties (e.g., jury service).
Only in the descriptive sense might domicile have any utility in
Shoe cases.
The above analysis applies equally well to the idea that a cor-
poration is always suable where it has its charter. 45 Modern cor-
poration statutes stay clear of the topic of personal jurisdiction.
While they may require the designation of an agent to receive
process, such statutes do not purport to judge the jurisdictional
effects of such service.1" As in the case of an individual's domi-
cile, I find no justification in suits against corporations for sub-
stituting per se personal jurisdictional rules in lieu of a Lockean
fairness balance.
2. Service of Process: Burnham v. Superior Court'47
The Scalia plurality in Burnham sits as the Pennoyer-island in
a sea of fairness. These Justices would have personal service with-
in the forum's territory always be valid service regardless of the
defendant's lack of other contacts with the forum. 4' In essence
this means that "benefits reaped and risks sown" is not part of
such a jurisdictional formula because the lack of contacts is not
part of their jurisdictional formula. Consequently, a Lockean reci-
145. See Developments, supra note 1, at 919 CMhere was never any dispute that a
domestic corporation could be sued on any cause of action.").
146. See, e.g., MODEL BUStNESs CORP. ACT § 5.04 (1991) (addressing service on regis-
tered agent of domestic corporation without mentioning jurisdictional effects of service);
id § 15.10 (addressing service on registered agent of foreign corporation without mention-
ing jurisdictional effects of service).
147. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
148. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (jurisdiction upheld for New Jersey father served
while in California with divorce petition stating that "physical presence alone constitutes
due process").
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procity is definitely not at work. Rather, an absolutist approach
much akin to Pennoyer's in rem jurisdiction resurfaces. Service
within the territory constitutes a "capturing" of the defendant, and
such authoritarianism is constitutionally permitted by all states as to
persons and properties within their territorial boundaries. The fun-
damental fairness required under the Due Process Clause is sup-
plied solely by the historical lineage of the idea.
I disagree with the concept that mere tradition creates per se
due process fairness, and believe that Scalia's opinion in Burnham
conflicts with Shaffer v. Heitner.t49 Those are polemics, however,
that I will entrust to others because they do not involve the
Lockean thesis elaborated herein. I will pause to note, however,
that Scalia's analysis of the precedents is little more than a first
year legal method trick. Justice Scalia rejected everybody's per-
spective on the International Shoe line of cases. Judges, academics,
lawyers, and students all thought that the in personam doctrine
elaborated in. those cases controlled all state court exercises of
jurisdiction over defendants, not just some subset.150
For example, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co., 15' although the corporate president was served in the forum,
the decision to assert personal jurisdiction was actually decided on
a fairness basis.1 52 Otherwise, the court's contacts analysis would
be irrelevant if in-hand in-forum service, alone, was constitutionally
sufficient. Further, I could spin the cases in the other direction by
asserting that the question was open in Burnham because if the
Court had never precisely determined that in-forum service was
invalid, neither had it precisely held that it was constitutionally
valid. Remember that the infamous attorney Mitchell, the subject of
Pennoyer, was not served within Oregon,'53 making the Court's
pronouncements on the point technically dicta.' 54 In addition, if
149. 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (rejecting quasi in rein jurisdiction under Pennoyer over out-
of-state defendant-directors by sequestering the defendants' stock, and instead holding that
the "minimum contacts" test from International Shoe must be applied).
150. See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604, 632 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that all
assertions of state court jurisdiction "must comport with contemporary notions of due pro-
cess").
151. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
152. For a discussion of Perkins see supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
153. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 719-20 (1877).
154. See id. at 724 (the Court's pronouncements that a non-resident within a state's
territory may be subject to in personam jurisdiction but a non-resident not within the
territory may only be subject to in rein jurisdiction were based on dicta).
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the question was still open at the time of Burnham, was not the
Shoe line of cases the most relevant corpus- of case law?
The Brennan opinion in Burnham concerns me more than
Scalia's plurality opinion because in applying Shoe it demonstrates
a weak grasp of the Lockean reciprocity implicated by the case
facts. Justice Brennan drastically overemphasizes what Burnham
reaped in his brief sojourn in California155 and drastically under-
states what Burnham is suffering at the hands of California





In reality, however, the balance is very different. California
will be judging Burnham's out-of-state (New Jersey) conduct, pos-
sibly using California substantive law in the process, to affect his
fundamental interest in his marital status, parental rights, continuing
economic obligations, and property holdings. Because the Justices
erroneously perceive the balance's power weight as the burden of a
foreign defense, they can minimize it, as does Brennan, by talking
of "modern" ameliorating improvements in "transportation and
communications." 57 A Lockean balance, however, would reverse
the result:
155. See Burnhamn v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 637-38 (stating that the forum state
provides "significant benefits" to a transient defendant).
156. Id. at 638-39 (stating that "the potential burdens on a transient defendant are
slight").
157. Id. at 638 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)
(quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
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From my perspective, the irony of Burnham is that Justice
Scalia is the only Justice who demonstrates an understanding of the
Lockean reciprocity underlying International Shoe, and yet he does
so solely to mock and reject it! He characterizes the Brennan anal-
ysis as that of an "equitable bargain" in which the defendant traded
three days' worth of California benefits for California decrees
disposing of his "worldly goods" and the custody of his
children. 5 He then mocks the trade as "unconscionabl[e].' 159
He is exactly correct! The problem is not with the Lockean mode
of analysis, which seeks true fairness and, as this essay demon-
strates, can obtain it with some assuredness. Rather, Brennan him-
self did not see the true "bargain" between California and the
defendant and, hence, failed to weigh the proper power factors and
even cheated on his benefits evaluation to load the scale in favor
of jurisdiction."W
Scalia is right, of course, that Shoe's "fair play" approach
breeds uncertainty,"' as does any constitutional formula which
weighs competing interests. The natural implication of Scalia's
"subjectiveness" critique,' 62 however, is that we should return to
158. Id. at 623-24.
159. Id. at 623 ("We daresay a contractual exchange swapping those benefits for that
power would not survive the 'unconscionability' provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code.").
160. Exactly what propelled him towards this preordained result is unclear.
161. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 626.
162. Id. at 623 ("Mhe concurrence's proposed standard [includes] each Justice's sub-
jective assessment of what is fair and just.").
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the simpler Pennoyer era: Was he served within the state? Was the
property attached? Where was the marital domicile? Was there
consent to jurisdiction? In my darkest moments I appreciate the
simplicity of these inquiries and the efficiency of the resolution
they would bring to the world of jurisdictional conflicts. Yet,
through Lockean reciprocity we can achieve a more fine-tuned
justice in the spirit of International Shoe while reducing the "ar-
guable" cases to a small number.
VII. DIVISIBLE JURISDICTION
By "divisible" jurisdiction I mean a judicial authority which is
not invariable and all-encompassing, but rather a quantum of limit-
ed power which shifts depending on the nature and degree of the
minimum contacts. This is a natural consequence of reciprocity
between a forum court's power and a defendant's forum contacts.
In other words, as a subject's contacts increase, the ability of the
community to impose rules and issue orders against him should
also increase because he, reciprocally, has increasingly benefited.
Conversely, in order to exercise any particular measure of authority
over that subject, the court must find a sufficient quantum of con-
tacts to justify, reciprocally, the surrendered natural autonomy.
The relevant question in a Shoe case then becomes: "Jurisdic-
tion to do what?" More fully, "Are there sufficient contacts to
justify the particular court action against the defendant that the
plaintiff proposes?" One does not sense that the Court interprets
the jurisdiction question in this manner. Instead, it appears that
once a court determines there is a minimum level of contacts, then
any degree or quantum of power to be exerted over the defendant
is acceptable, regardless of whether that degree of power outweighs
the level of contacts.
Why must a court have all power or no power? What reason-
ing supports this approach? The Supreme Court offers no expla-
nation because it has never conceptualized Shoe as I have. For
example, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., the Court did men-
tion the nature of power being asserted in light of the nature of the
defendant's conduct in the forum state.' 63 Yet, it did not express-
ly state that Hustler's contact with New Hampshire had to increase
correspondingly in relation to the degree of power exerted in order
163. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75 (1984). See also su-
pra note 77 (discussing Keeton using a Lockean balancing of "contacts" versus "power").
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to achieve fairness. This was, in part, an "arising out of' case be-
cause Keeton sought damages for injury to her reputation in New
Hampshire by the circulation there of libelous magazines."'6 Yet
it was also a case in which a state called upon a defendant to re-
spond for the same act and corresponding injury committed outside
that state's borders. 65
The Court was right in its assessment that Hustler's sales of
the offending issues within the forum state provided sufficient
contacts to make it fair for New Hampshire to remediate Keeton's
New Hampshire-based reputational damages. This exemplifies aris-
ing-out-of reciprocity. The question that remains, however, is why
these contacts justified New Hampshire's power to collect the
extra-territorial damages? It would seem that the benefits derived
by Hustler in New Hampshire were outweighed substantially by
New Hampshire's exercise of this "extra" power.
One might conclude, then, that the Keeton Court treated juris-
diction as unitary. Once the Court became convinced that the de-
fendant had "sufficient" contacts with New Hampshire, it granted
New Hampshire unquantified jurisdiction."6 Presumably Keeton
could have amended her complaint to seek five billion dollars in
punitive damages, or the New Hampshire attorney general could
have intervened to seek dissolution of the corporate offender for its
indecent conduct.
The Court often does not specify the relief requested by the
plaintiff in these Shoe cases, thereby supporting my proposition
that the Court considers it irrelevant to in personam doctrine. Yet,
were the Court to understand and accept the significance of a
plaintiff's requested relief in terms of the Lockean reciprocity,
much existing confusion would be dispelled. In cases of "minor"
power exercises, the Court would not feel obligated to exaggerate
the significance of extraneous considerations such as the burden on
the defendant defending in a distant forum or as in its vacuous
164. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777.
165. In other words, Ms. Keeton was seeking "nationwide damages for all copies of
[Hustler] even though a small portion of the copies were distributed in New Hampshire."
Id. at 775.
166. A second possibility is that the Court threw a hefty interstate federalism weight
(the "single publication" rule) on the pro-jurisdiction side of the balance. Id. at 777-78
(rule promoting a forum for efficiently litigating in a single proceeding all issues and
damages claims arising out of a libel). If so, the Hustler case teaches that "other factors"
can be weighty enough to defeat a defendant's liberty interest in a fair correspondence
between benefits and duties.
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"foreseeability" or "stream-of-commerce" rationales. In cases of
"major" prayers for relief, the Court should have to find real, sub-
stantial forum-state benefits to the defendant.
A divorce case illustrates the concept of divisible jurisdiction.
In this type of proceeding, a court enters many orders and decrees
which vary in their impact upon the defendant. Some such judicial
acts, in order of increasing severity include: 1) discovery orders to
establish subject matter or in personam jurisdiction; 2) discovery
orders to locate or evaluate assets; 3) temporary restraining orders;
4) alimony pendente lite; 5) child support and alimony; 6) visita-
tion; 7) property division; 8) custody; and 9) divorce. If a
defendant's contacts are heavy enough, the court then has the pow-
er to issue a divorce decree, 67 the most "impacting" order. In
addition to the divorce decree, fairness permits the court power to
enter any of the lesser "impacting" orders. However, if the contact
weight is not so heavy, the court is limited to a less onerous de-
cree. Thus, as the contact weight decreases, there will be a corre-
sponding decrease in the severity of the order the court can issue.
Therefore, a divorce case might involve multiple jurisdictional
rulings. If jurisdiction is challenged, the court could make an initial
determination of whether there are sufficient contacts to merit
discovery and temporary orders. After discovery, the court would
then determine whether the challenger of jurisdiction had sufficient
contacts, on the whole record, to justify the court's entering sup-
port orders against him and determining his access to the children.
This methodology of sequential jurisdictional rulings could be
applied to other types of cases.
167. Shoe buffs will instantly spot the example's smudge: personal jurisdiction has been
based upon plaintiffs' domicile, illustrating the rare instance when plaintiffs' contacts reign
supreme. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942) (domicile of plaintiff
recognized as essential in order to give the court jurisdiction when the defendant has nei-
ther been personally served nor entered an appearance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 71 (1971) (summarizing Williams v. North Carolina as accepting the
domicile of one spouse alone as adequate jurisdiction to issue a valid divorce decree but
inadequate to enter a judgment ordering support or terminating a duty of support owed
the spouse by the other). Yet because of the multiplicity of enterable orders, I prefer not
to abandon my hypothetical. Perhaps the reader will indulge me by assuming that one
spouse has left his or her domicile and is suing in a state with some affiliations with
defendant.
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VIII. TESTING THE BALANCE
I will now test my analysis by applying it to some recent
federal courts of appeals' Shoe decisions. 6 ' Parenthetically, the
still enormous volume of personal jurisdiction decisions reported
confirms the existence of doctrinal incoherence and the resulting
potential for abusive, dilatory lawyer "moves."
A. Case 1169
The plaintiff, a resident of Michigan, is a truck driver whose
hand was crushed when his truck was being loaded at the
defendant's lumberyard in Windsor, Ontario (ten miles from the
forum court in Detroit). Given the nature of the injury, the plaintiff
presumably has requested a sizeable amount of damages. The re-
cord on the defendant's motion to dismiss is comprised of conflict-
ing "contacts" claims asserted by the opposing parties. Unlike the
other cases analyzed, we cannot in this case make a final resolu-
tion simply because of the factual dispute. We can, however, test
each side's position on jurisdiction using our Lockean analysis.
1. Plaintiffs Assertions
The defendant Matthews regularly sells lumber in the United
States, and often in Michigan. He contracts with Michigan truckers
to do hauling, and hired the plaintiff's employer for this particular
haul. The plaintiff claims that the defendant maintains an apartment
in Oak Park, Michigan (although the extent to which he uses this
residence is unclear). Furthermore, both parties concede that the
defendant maintains a post office box in Royal Oak, Michigan and
runs a telephone listing in the Detroit yellow pages (which the re-
cord notes is in the smallest available type). The plaintiff cites
these contacts as sufficient'to establish jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.
This is a "hard" case when analyzed by Lockean principles.
The cause of action arises from acts and subsequent injury that
occurred in Canada.' Consequently, this case can be character-
168. The response to a WESTLAW inquiry was that these cases are the most recently
reported Shoe decisions.
169. Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454 (6th Cir. 1991).
170. The fact that the plaintiff brought his injuries back to his Michigan home is irrele-
vant; the defendant cannot be held accountable for the plaintiff's subsequent peregrina-
tions.
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ized as a general jurisdiction one because the defendant's Michigan
affiliations are "unrelated" to the cause of action that arose in
Canada.
Since this is not an "arising out of case" which is "easy" under
a Lockean analysis, the "benefits" of the defendant's contacts with
the forum need to be weighed against the "power" that will be
exerted on the defendant to determine whether personal jurisdiction
here would be fair. The benefits the defendant derives from his
dealings with Michigan are significant. The defendant arranges
hundreds of lumber deliveries per year, much akin to a Michigan
trader. In addition, the heavy loads he dispatches to Michigan are
burdensome to the state in that the hauling is somewhat laden with
risk. In addition, although the details are sketchy, the defendant's
Michigan residence makes the affiliation stronger. All of these
affiliations combined create a "large contacts" weight.
Therefore, the power gained by the court through its jurisdic-
tion enables it to enter a large judgment against the defendant.
Although the burden of a foreign defense is slight-Canada and
Michigan are separated only by a border and the defendant is a
Michigan habitu6-once the defendant arrives at the courthouse the
impact of the court's jurisdiction will be severe. Thus, the state's
"power" also is a "large" weight.
Since the contacts and power weights are in equipoise, we
must draw upon other, non-Lockean factors. Because of the prox-
imity of Windsor to Detroit, the case involves metropolitan busi-
ness transactions which flow freely across national boundaries. It is
vital that Michigan, at least in some cases, be able to assert juris-
diction over nearby Canadian traders, not only to protect its resi-
dents but also to facilitate multi-party litigation. While Detroit
judges would be interpreting and applying Canadian law, they are
called upon to do so regularly and are likely comfortable with
Canada's common law system. Consequently, this should ameliorate
the adverse impact on the defendant of having foreigners judging
his conduct in Canada. This "state need" propels the fairness bal-
ance toward extending jurisdiction which resolves the matter since
no other consideration seems particularly compelling.
2. Defendant's Assertions
The picture that emerges from the defendant's affidavits is
quite different. He is a Canadian citizen who does not buy or sell
lumber but merely runs a trans-shipment yard for Canadian dealers.
These dealers make their own deals in the United States and them-
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selves hire truckers, including the plaintiff. The defendant maintains
no residence in Michigan but once dated a woman who resides in
Royal Oak. The only continuing contacts he has with Michigan are
the yellow page advertisement in fine print and the post office box
which is intended to facilitate his receipt of mail from the .United
States.
From this perspective the case is an easy one against jurisdic-
tion. The benefits accruing to the defendant by virtue of the mail
drop and the telephone listing are miniscule as compared to the
plaintiff's major tort claim stemming from Canadian events. Hence,
from the defendant's perspective, Lockean analysis reveals that
"power" overwhelms "contacts" and jurisdiction should be denied.
B. Case 2171
A partnership owns a building in Minnesota, the roof of which
collapsed, killing the plaintiff's husband. She brings a wrongful
death action against the several partners, each of which is incorpo-
rated, a resident, or domiciled outside of Minnesota. The plaintiff
demonstrates no affiliating circumstances except ownership of the
building and the fact that one partner, a corporation, has appointed
a Minnesota agent to receive service of process.
This seems an easy case for jurisdiction. The partners have
"entered" Minnesota by means of their property. Besides having
created large risks to Minnesotians, due to the dangerousness of
their building, they have profited largely from the network of state
and substate laws which makes such ownership feasible. More
important, their "entry" has resulted in the death of plaintiff's
husband. Logically, then, Minnesota can justifiably claim the judi-
cial power necessary to remediate the harms caused within the state
by the partners.172
Although the fact that the corporate defendants had appointed
an agent to receive service of process would facilitate reaching
these defendants, that fact alone would ordinarily not be of much
jurisdictional significance. 173 Appointment of such an agent would
171. Ytuarte v. Gruner & Jahr Printing and Publishing Co., 935 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.
1991).
172. However, in this case, the Eighth Circuit found to the contrary without any reason-
ing. See id. at 972-73 (stating that plaintiff's argument for jurisdiction based on ownership
of property within the state and production there of goods intended for worldwide dis-
tribution "is entirely without merit, and requires no further discussion-).
173. The Court, however, actually used this appointment to assert jurisdiction over these
partners because, under Minnesota law, such an appointment was considered consent to
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assist an assertion that the corporation is transacting business with-
in the state. However, the volume and nature of such business
should still have to be ascertained and proved. Of course, if
Burnham"74 becomes accepted law and is extended to service up-
on corporate agents, the plaintiff need merely execute service upon
the agent."
C. Case 3176
The defendant 'was hired through brokers to transport the
plaintiff's twine from Brazil, where the plaintiff had bought it, to a
port in Wisconsin. The defendant is a one-ship company incorpo-
rated in Liberia, with a principal place of business in Greece. The
ship and thus the plaintiff's twine sank en route to Wisconsin. The
defendant had no other affiliation with Wisconsin, where the plain-
tiff filed suit in federal court, although the defendant had once
unloaded a cargo of beans in Duluth, Minnesota.
Under a Lockean approach, this represents the easiest of juris-
diction cases.'" As the court sardonically commented, "Minnesota
is not Wisconsin"'78 and though Duluth is next to Wisconsin,
"close counts only in horseshoes."' 79 The court found 1no con-
tacts, hence, no personal jurisdiction. The decision is consistent
with Lockean analysis becaue the defendant has neither reaped
benefits from nor created any risks within Wisconsin.
D. Case 410°
The defendant, Bunstein, was based in Massachusetts as a vice
president of sales for a nationwide brokerage house. One of his
clients set up operations in Florida and borrowed heavily from the
plaintiff, Sun Bank. An employee of Sun Bank placed two phone
Minnesota jurisdiction "for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities
with the state." Id. at 973. See generally supra text accompanying notes 129-33 (discuss-
ing when a corporation consents to jurisdiction).
174. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
175. See supra notes 147-50, 155-62 and accompanying text (criticizing the Burnhan;
Court's extension of jurisdiction solely based upon the valid service of process within the
forum).
176. United Rope Distrib., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir.
1991).
177. Appellant-plaintiff's stronger case was that a federal admiralty court could count
the shipping company's national contacts as the relevant Shoe contacts. Id. at 534-35. The
complex argument on this point is beyond this article's scope.
178. Id. at 533.
179. Id. at 534.
180. Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 926 F.2d 1030 (1lth Cir. 1991).
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calls to the defendant to verify the securities listed in the personal
financial statement provided to the bank by the defendant's client.
During the phone conversations, the defendant made representations
about his client's stock holdings which the trial court found to be
fraudulent. Sun Bank sued Bunstein in the Middle District of Flori-
da when the borrower defaulted and the securities proved inade-
quate to satisfy a judgment. 8'
Under a Lockean analysis, this is an easy case. Bunstein delib-
erately deceived the Florida bank, causing damage in that jurisdic-
tion. One may safely assume that Bunstein was aware that Sun
Bank was situated in Florida and knew why the bank needed the
information about the borrower's assets (meaning that Bunstein's
"entry" into the forum state was conscious and voluntary). The
falsifications created substantial risks for Sun Bank which asks
only to remedy the harm which ensued within Florida court juris-
diction.
This is simple "arising out of reciprocity," no different from
any case where a defendant has created risk within the forum state.
We need not search for benefits accruing to Bunstein (for example,
enhancing his status with his client); risk-creating conduct within a
forum state, when it produces actual harm, obligates an actor to
respond there for the conduct's consequences.
Conversely, in the actual case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
Bunstein lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Florida and
therefore, the state could not constitutionally exercise personal
jurisdiction over him.'82 The court described the contacts as "for-
tuitous," emphasizing that Bunstein had not placed the phone calls
nor sought out Sun Bank's business.'83 Remarkably, it even con-
cluded that Bunstein could not have foreseen being suable in Flori-
da.i" This result and reasoning defy common sense. Without
question Bunstein could have gauged the effects of his false state-
ments on the bank's lending posture, realizing the possible detri-
mental consequences for the bank in case of default. The fact that
the bank initiated the phone calls does not undercut the magnitude
or willingness of Bunstein's actions.
181. Id. at 1031-32.
182. Id. at 1034-35.
183. Id. at 1034.
184. Id.
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E. Case 5185
Mr. Overton is a pro se plaintiff claiming that a federal officer,
Ms. Crepo, illegally and maliciously filed notices of federal tax
lien on his property. 86 Because the plaintiff could not connect
Crepo with New Mexico (the forum state), the Tenth Circuit sum-
marily affirmed her dismissal from the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction.8 7 Had Overton had the benefit of legal training, he
might have had a fighting chance. Presumably, Crepo is a national
or regional officer who had contacts with New Mexico, directly or
through her subordinates, by means of communications with a
property registry in the forum state. Arguably, the filing of the tax
lien could be considered just as much an act of entry as Hess'
entering Massachusetts in a car' and International Life Insur-
ance Company entering California with an offer to insure Lulu
McGee.' Crepo derived benefits from New Mexico's property
laws and offices, risking substantial harms to property holders in
that state, even to the state itself, if her filings proved defective.
Under this line of argument, sufficient contacts to the forum could
be established, justifying personal jurisdiction.
F. Case 6'90
In this case, the defendant, Netlink, had qualified under the
corporation law of Pennsylvania and had done an unspecified
amount of business there for three and one-half years, 9 ' after
which time it withdrew its Pennsylvania authorization to conduct
business."' The plaintiff, Bane, a former employee of Netlink,
sued for violation of federal age discrimination laws in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania after such withdrawal.' 93
185. Overton v. United States, 925 F.2d 1282 (10th Cir. 1991).
186. Id. at 1282.
187. See id. at 1283 (finding nothing in the record to connect the defendant to New
Mexico).
188. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
189. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
190. Bane v. Netlink, 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991). This case is a fine example of how
the in personain thicket can cause even the finest of judges to stumble.
191. Id. at 639. Pennsylvania law makes a foreign corporation's qualification to do busi-
ness in the state a consent to "general personal jurisdiction." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5301(a)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1991).
192. Id
193. Id. at 640. Netlink was served by mail in Massachusetts. Telephone Interview with
Alan Epstein, Esq., (Jan. 17, 1992).
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A Lockean perspective immediately observes that the explicit
consent to suit was withdrawn when the defendant left the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania. Therefore, jurisdiction over the corpo-
ration in any subsequent suit in that forum would need to be justi-
fied by constructive consent, utilizing a balancing fairness analysis.
In this particular case, the corporate actions and their effects on the
plaintiff occurred outside of Pennsylvania which forced his in per-
sonam claim into the difficult category of general jurisdiction."9
If Netlink had reaped large benefits from its connection with the
Pennsylvania market, perhaps a case might be made that its Penn-
sylvania contacts were sufficiently substantial that it should be
suable there for its activities elsewhere in the United States.
The Third Circuit does not quantify the level of the defendant's
Pennsylvania business activities but proceeds to assert jurisdiction
over Netlink there based on an unconventional method of analysis.
When the plaintiff's claim arose (his firing in Massachusetts),
Netlink's Pennsylvania business certificate was in effect.' 95 Be-
cause at that time Netlink had invoked the benefits and protections
of that state's laws, Netlink was suable there. According to the
Third Circuit this "suability" continued until the plaintiff actually
sued, despite the fact that the defendant had withdrawn its business
certification by then." Doing business is, of course, distinguish-
able from registering to do business, the latter being a de jure
affiliation with little de facto substance. If Netlink had fired Bane
in Pennsylvania, certainly it could be held accountable there for the
harmful, lingering effects of its actions in that state. Yet how the
act of once registering has the effect of extending jurisdiction over
claims arising from Netlink's extra-Pennsylvania activities escapes
the imagination.
G. Case 7197
As in Keeton,"g8 the libel plaintiff in this case searched for a
generous statute of limitations and found one in Florida where he
194. Bane, 925 F.2d at 639-40 (only addressing whether there was general jurisdiction
and leaving alone the district court's holding that Pennsylvania did not have specific
jurisdiction over the defendant).
195. Id. at 640.
196. See id. at 640-41 (reasoning that the registration statute continued to be in effect
so long as the defendant has liability in that state which arose prior to withdrawing).
197. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1990).
198. keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). See supra notes 77 and
163-66 and accompanying text.
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sued entertainer Daryl Hall of the music group "Hall and Oates."
While in New York, Hall had made some unkind remarks about
Madara, the plaintiff, in a telephone interview with a reporter for
Music Connection, a California-based magazine.'99 According to
the record, some eighteen copies of the offending issue were
mailed into Florida.2" In addition, the plaintiff alleged in his
brief that additional copies were sold at the newstands.2°'
Although this case borders, jurisdictionally, on the frivolous, it
earned seven pages of earnest court of appeals' Shoe analysis,
including the comment that Hall did not appoint the magazine as
his agent to receive service of process.2" Hall's affiliations with
Florida were tenuous: some concerts, record sales, and investment
in a partnership which invested in a partnership owning property in
Florida. 3 None of these contacts related to the alleged tort. The
"contacts" weight was, therefore, patently out of balance with the
Floridian "power" weight sought to be exercised against the defen-
dant. The court's decision not to assert jurisdiction is consistent
then with Lockean analysis.
H. Case 8204
Our next example is a legal malpractice suit brought in the
Northern District of Illinois by two Illinois businesses against their
Michigan law firms. One defendant had served as general counsel,
the other as a securities specialist. Although the Seventh Circuit
found that the case qualified for nationwide service under the
bankruptcy law, 205 "for the sake of thoroughness,"2" the court
issued an alternative pro-jurisdiction holding based on minimum
contacts analysis. 27
This is an easy case argued in a federal appellate court. The
defendants, lawyers, had repeatedly entered the forum in order to
199. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1513 (quoting Appellant's Record Excerpts and Appendix,
A39, A41 (copy of Music Connection interview)). Hall had said that the plaintiff was a
"small-time" guy who had "screwed" him when they worked together.
200. Id. at 1517.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1519.
203. Id. at 1517.
204. Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied
III S. Ct. 968 (1991).
205. Id. at 1244.
206. Id. at 1245.
207. See id. at 1245-49 (determining that the attorneys' alleged conduct giving rise to
the malpractice claim was sufficient to subject them to jurisdiction in Illinois).
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serve their clients' needs. Their representation included regularly
entering into Illinois by mail, phone and personal visits." They
benefited from the Illinois legal structure which facilitates the prac-
tice of law. Simultaneously, they created risks for Illinois residents
and businesses if the firms' legal work proved defective. The mal-
practice claim alleged a failure to warn the plaintiffs against certain
unsound business practices in which the plaintiffs were participat-
ig, and a failure to disclose conflicts of interests inherent in the
defendants' representation. Because both the claims "arose from'
acts within the state of Illinois, that state may justifiably claim the
power necessary to remediate any harmful consequences of such
entry.
I. Case 9209
The penultimate example in our series involves a lawyer
welching on his debts to an expert witness he had hired for three
cases.2"0 The murkiness of the Shoe doctrine enabled the lawyer
to perpetrate more injustice by taking the personal jurisdiction
question to the Seventh Circuit. This is because a dilatory debtor,
especially a lawyer, can fire enough verbal flak from the Shoe
arsenal to protect himself from paying damages for a frivolous
appeal.
The ambiguity inherent in the Shoe doctrine veils the fact that
when the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff's fees as promised,
his breach then "entered" Wisconsin to the detriment of its citizens.
This exemplifies McGee "arising out of reciprocity" discussed
earlier and consequently is a simple case for jurisdiction.21'
208. Id. at 1247.
209. Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1990).
210. Id. at 1215 (Although the defendant attorney had entered Wisconsin and made
three offers to the plaintiff expert witness who accepted them all, he later refused to pay
the plaintiff in breach of contract.).
211. Furthermore, the record indicated that the defendant knowingly reached out to a
Wisconsin business with which he sustained a continuous, four-year relationship. Id. at
1219. Also, the plaintiff's sole locus of business was in Wisconsin and it was there that
the defendant first solicited plaintiff's services. Id. at 1216. In addition, the plaintiff per-
formed a substantial portion of the contract while physically in Wisconsin, reviewing
"voluminous documentation" sent to him by the defendant. Id. These affiliating acts of the
defendant clearly demonstrate the Lockean reciprocity necessary for a forum state to assert
jurisdiction.
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J. Case 10212
The last of the series, Asarco, like Case 3,213 deals with a
ship's cargo lost at sea. This case, however, is somewhat distin-
guishable by the fact that one defendant, the manager of the ill-
fated vessel, had managed twenty vessels entering ports of the
forum state, Louisiana, at various times during the preceding five
years. In reaching its conclusion that the defendants lacked suffi-
cient minimum contacts to be subject to personal jurisdiction in
Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the fact that it was the
charterers who controlled ports of entry, and not the defendants.
This line of reasoning, however, confuses consent with reciprocity.
As long as the manager's employees benefited from Louisiana's
political order, that it was the choice of others to enter the forum
is irrelevant. When there has not been actual consent to jurisdic-
tion, Lockean theory turns to a philosophical benefit-burden reci-
procity which bases fairness not on an affirmative choice but on
the relationship between state and individual.
The defendant manager had contacts with Louisiana consisting
of the twenty times it had previously entered the state. The ques-
tion thus becomes one of evaluating this contact weight against the
power sought by Louisiana. Arguably, the ability to assess damages
for loss of valuable cargo against a Hong Kong corporation by.
virtue of laws, federal and state, foreign to that corporation, is an
extraordinary exercise of power. In agreement with the conclusion
of the Fifth Circuit, the Lockean approach would compel a conclu-
sion that the manager's unrelated prior Louisiana visits were too
infrequent and insubstantial to justify such an extraordinary exer-
tion of power.
IX. CONCLUSION
Have I achieved the simplification promised at the outset? I
believe so. Assuming that run-of-the-mill powers are asserted,
meaning nothing extraordinary in light of the defendant's forum
state contacts, the following categories of personal jurisdiction
cases now should have a more uniform outcome when tested
against Lockean analysis:
212. Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1990).
213. See United Rope Distributors, Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532 (7th
Cir. 1991). See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
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1. cases against in-state defendants (including domiciliaries
and residents);
2. cases where actual consent is demonstrated;
3. cases where the cause of action is "arising out of' the
defendant's contact with the forum state;
4. cases where the defendant has no contact with the
forum state.
Undoubtedly, in certain cases there will be some degree of dis-
,agreement over the following questions: Where did the claim arise?
What was the extent of consent? Was there a nexus between the
individual, the action, and the state? No doctrine is free from such
"application" tasks. The important contribution of Locke is to pro-
vide understanding why these categories are analytically "easy"
cases that will produce an arguable contention only occasionally.
Understanding and acceptance of the concepts espoused in this
essay should aid judges to resolve most Shoe motions quickly and
smoothly. Judicial acceptance of these concepts will also prevent
lawyers from playing jurisdictional games on the basis of the ver-
bal and conceptual ambiguities of Shoe and its progeny.
Furthermore, the Lockean analysis advances an ordered, intelli-
gible method for analyzing cases which do not conform to the four
categories listed above. These problematic cases are those in which
the defendant's out-of-forum activities are the subject of judicial
scrutiny or when some extreme measure of forum power is request-
ed. By focusing on the "power versus contacts" reciprocity, a court
should be able to reach a fairness judgment more efficiently. Only
in a handful of cases will courts justifiably turn to the "other fac-
tors" which, unfortunately, have clouded and cluttered in personam
thinking for decades.
Years ago, Professor Hazard stated that Pennoyer had "long
since proved inadequate to hold the problem cases in predictable
and useful relationship to each other, which is what a conceptual
system is for."2" 4 While Hazard's important article helped recon-
cile the branches of in rem and in personam jurisdiction," 5 the
214. Hazard, supra note 1, at 277-78. Hazard goes on to suggest that quasi in rem and
in rein jurisdiction should be abolished and property merely should become a -transac-
tional event that provides a legitimate basis for plenary jurisdiction pursuant to the mini-
mum-contacts rule." Id. at 282.
215. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199, 205, 210 (1977) (citing Hazard's arti-
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eminent professor curiously remained satisfied with an arbitrary,
structureless theory. "Minimum contacts," in Hazard's mind, called
for "arbitrary particularization '  or, a "pointillist process of lo-
cating particular cases on one side of the line or the other. 2 17
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction, it seems, needs huge
blocks of time to reveal its rationality, like a decades-long triple
play: from Pennoyer to Shoe to Shaffer to Locke. Perhaps Lockean
reciprocity will provide the ordering concept that will substitute
rational analysis in lieu of "pointillism", thus ending this wearying
jurisdictional game.
216. Hazard, supra note 1, at 283 n.149 (arguing that it would be "infinitely preferable
to have a sensible general theory with arbitrary categorical subsystems than . . . an un-
sensible general system with arbitrary categorical subsystems").
217. Id. at 274.
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